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INTRODUCTION

The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) was
transformed in 1983 from an inter-American regional association of securities regulators
into an international body.' It is now an association of securities commissions and main
financial regulators for more than 100 countries that regulate more than 90% of the
world's securities markets. IOSCO's primary role is to promote high standards of
securities regulation and to act as a forum for national regulators to cooperate with one
another.2
Like other international financial bodies, IOSCO has responded to the financial
crisis of 2008. Previously, in response to the Asian financial crisis of 1998, IOSCO
developed its Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation to establish a framework
for the regulation of securities markets, intermediaries, securities issuers, and collective

* Centennial Professor of Law and Co-Director, Dennis J. Block Center for the Study of International Business
Law, Brooklyn Law School and former Commissioner, Securities and Exchange Commission. A summer
research grant from Brooklyn Law School was of assistance in the preparation of this Article. The author
gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Brooklyn Law School students Boris Brownstein,
Christopher Garrison, and Ilan Wong. This Article presents information on regulatory developments up to
January 2012.
1. INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'NS (IOSCO), http://www.iosco.org (last visited June 22, 2012).
2. Id.
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investment schemes. 3 Ten years later, IOSCO determined that its objectives and
principles were not designed to prevent systemic risk and were therefore insufficient. 4
IOSCO thus revised its objectives and principles and added eight new principles,
including two that specifically focused on systemic risk. 5 IOSCO's ongoing efforts to
support these new Principles are parallel to efforts by other financial regulators to deal
with systemic risk. Yet, IOSCO's efforts focus on somewhat different issues in the
capital markets than the issues of interest to bank regulators.
Systemic risk in the securities markets is not primarily about prudential regulation.
Rather, it concerns activities by non-banking intermediaries, sometimes referred to as the
shadow banking sector,6 transparency and soundness in the capital markets, trading
practices, and risks from market innovations. The risks posed by these intermediaries are
in some ways more subtle and difficult to understand and control than the risks posed by
too-big-to-fail banks. Further, in a number of the areas in which IOSCO is attempting to
set standards, the United States and the European Union have taken some divergent
regulatory paths, and Asian markets may be engaging in competitive regulatory strategies
that pose a threat to established markets in the United States and Europe.
Part II of this Article will outline IOSCO's Objectives and Principles and explain
how IOSCO revised them in response to the financial crisis of 2008.7 Part III will discuss
certain key initiatives where a lack of harmonization would be detrimental to effective
regulation.8 In particular, this Part will focus on the regulation of hedge funds, credit
rating agencies, short selling, and technological innovations, including direct electronic
access, dark pools, and high frequency trading. 9 These topics have been selected because
they are not within the traditional purview of bank regulators and are securities regulatory
concerns related to systemic risk in the capital markets. Part IV will discuss IOSCO'S
role in the international harmonization process and whether IOSCO can successfully raise
standards in these controversial areas in the face of political pressure from market players
and competition between capital market centers. 10
This Article concludes that IOSCO's harmonization efforts tend to be at a level of
generality that may be an insufficient prod to regulatory reform. When national interests
are at stake, securities regulators follow those interests rather than IOSCO directives.
Since IOSCO has no enforcement mechanisms aside from peer pressure, and its members
are so numerous and varied, it is unrealistic to expect rigorous and detailed harmonization

3. Mitigating Systemic Risk: A Role for Securities Regulators, IOSCO 7 (Feb. 2011),
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdflIOSCOPD347.pdf [hereinafter Mitigating Risk]. For the original list
of principles, see Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, IOSCO, at i-iv (Sept. 1998),
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD82.pdf.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. There is little common understanding of what the shadow banking sector is. See ZOLTAN POZSAR ET
AL., FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., STAFF REPORT No. 458, SHADOW BANKING 4-6 (2010), available at
http://www.ny.frb.org/research/staffreports/sr458.pdf (discussing the difficulty of defining shadow banking).
Some believe it is all of the intermediaries and products that substitute for banking; others would limit the sector
to the creation of credit outside of bank credit. The definitions can make a difference.
7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra Part III.
9. Id.
10. See infra Part IV.
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of new standards of conduct or regulation. Nevertheless, IOSCO can play a useful role in
highlighting critical emerging areas where securities regulation is in need of reform, and
it has done so with regard to a number of systemic risk issues in the trading markets.
II. IOSCO'S OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES
The IOSCO principles report of June 2010 sets forth three objectives of securities
regulation. These objectives include: protecting investors (including customers or other
consumers of financial services); ensuring that markets are fair, efficient, and transparent;
and reducing systemic risk.I1 It is worth noting at the outset that since the United States
is the only country in the world that separates securities and financial futures
regulation, 12 IOSCO's references to security markets include the derivatives markets. 13
The 38 IOSCO principles are grouped into nine categories: regulators; self-regulation;
securities regulation enforcement; cooperation in regulation; issuers; auditors, credit
rating agencies, and other information providers; collective investment schemes; market
intermediaries; and secondary markets. The first four relate to the organization, powers,
and functioning of regulatory agencies. 14
When IOSCO revised its principles in an attempt to provide guidance on how to
address the issues highlighted by the crisis, it adopted two of its eight new principles
relating to the regulator that focus on risk. 15 Principle six addresses the securities
regulator's role and conduct in identifying, assessing, and mitigating systemic risk, and
Principle seven exhorts the regulator to regularly review the regulatory perimeter. 16
IOSCO is currently developing an appropriate methodology to support these new
principles and has already incorporated the identification and mitigation of systemic risk
in its strategic mission and goals for the next five years. 17 It also believes that it is well
suited to lead responses to emerging regulatory issues. 18
IOSCO's fifth category of principles relating to issuers touches on risk in that it
states that there should be "full, accurate and timely disclosure of financial results, risk
and other information which is material to investors' decisions." 1 9 Like the principles
relating to issuers, the remaining principles relate to players in the capital markets, who
are gatekeepers, members of the shadow banking system, or non-bank intermediaries. 20
Some of these principles now focus on risk. 2 1 Principle 27 relates to collective
investment shares, which promotes regulation that ensures "a proper and disclosed basis
for asset valuation and the pricing and redemption of units in a collective investment

11. Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, IOSCO 3 (June 2010), http://www.complianceexchange.com/govemance/ibrary/ioscoprinciples2l00.pdf [hereinafter IOSCO Principles].
12. See DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED
FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 137-44 (2008).

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

IOSCO Principles,supranote 11, at 3 n. 1.
Id. at 4-12.
Id. at 4.
Id.
MitigatingRisk, supra note 3, at 13.
Id. at 14.
IOSCO Principles,supra note 11, at 8.
See id.
at9-12.
See id.
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scheme," and Principle 28, which calls for regulation to "ensure that hedge funds and/or
hedge fund managers are subject to appropriate oversight." 22 Under the principles for
market intermediaries, Principle 30 provides that there should be initial and ongoing
capital and other prudential requirements for market intermediaries that reflect the risks
they undertake, and Principle 32 provides that there should be procedures for dealing
with the failure of a market intermediary to contain systemic risk. 2 3 Finally, under the
principles for secondary markets, Principle 37 provides that regulation should aim to
ensure the proper management of large exposures, default risk, and market disruption,
and Principle 38 provides that securities settlement systems and central counterparties
should be subject to regulation to reduce risk. 24
The IOSCO objectives and principles are very general, so it is necessary to look to
more specific papers to appreciate the strictures on regulating risk by securities
commissions. IOSCO published one such paper, entitled Mitigating Systemic Risk: A
Role for Securities Regulators, in February 2011.25 IOSCO's Technical Committee
prepared this paper; the committee is comprised of regulators from the major capital
markets, and U.S. and European regulators often dominate it. 26 The paper points out that
securities regulation has traditionally focused on disclosure and business conduct
oversight instead of systemic risk, which was relegated by monetary authorities and
financial regulators. 27 This traditional split in oversight proved insufficient in the 2008
crisis, particularly when risks arose from areas not within the traditional oversight of
securities regulators. 28 Examples of factors that threatened financial stability and were
not mitigated by business conduct oversight included: the role of the shadow banking
system; "the interconnectedness of the global market place"; the lack of incentives that
market participants had to curb inappropriate risks; the innovation and complexity of
financial products that resulted in information asymmetries and inadequate disclosure; the
increasingly more difficult and costly management of conflicts; "the cyclicality of
financial markets"; and the inherent risks in over-the-counter (OTC) markets' "lack of
transparency and robust infrastructure." 29
The IOSCO paper analyzed the sources and transmission of systemic risks as
coming from size, interconnectedness, lack of substitutes and concentration, lack of
transparency, leverage, market participant behavior, and information asymmetry and
moral hazard. 30 The Technical Committee urged regulators to be mindful of regulatory
gaps and explained how these gaps can contribute to the build-up of systemic risk. Most

22. Id at 10.
23. Id. at 11.
24. IOSCO Principles,supra note 11, at 12.
25. See generally MitigatingRisk, supra note 3 (discussing and revising the original list of principles).
26. Members of the Technical Committee, IOSCO, http://www.iosco.org/lists/displaycommittees
.cfin?cmtid=3 (last visited June 22, 2012) (listing current members of the IOSCO Technical Committee).
Ironically, the Securities and Exchange Commission has often used IOSCO to promote higher standards than
U.S. regulators have been able to impose. See Roberta S. Karmel & Claire R. Kelly, The Hardeningof Soft Law
in Securities Regulation, 34 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 883, 907 (2009) (citing a historical example of the SEC
advocating stronger measures than it adopted).
27. MitigatingRisk, supra note 3, at 8.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 8-9.
30. Id. at 16-29.
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notably, exemptions for particular market elements from regulatory oversight and the
policy considerations underlying these exemptions should be considered and evaluated on
an ongoing basis. Similarly, regulators should address gaps that arise from activities that
are currently lightly regulated, as well as new market activities for which there are not yet
regulatory responses. To address regulatory gaps arising outside of its jurisdiction, a
securities regulator should conduct regular reviews of the perimeter of its regulation,
coordinate with other regulators who do have the supervisory authority, and cooperate
with international regulators. This analysis might seem very general, but it pinpoints
several of the causes of the financial meltdown: the failure to regulate swaps and credit
derivatives; the failure to regulate mortgage brokers; the failure to regulate hedge funds
or credit rating agencies; the inadequate regulation of securitized products; and U.S.
31
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) exemptions for sophisticated investors.
These failures were endemic to a deregulatory philosophy in the United States and
elsewhere. It is difficult to blame securities regulators when, at least in the United States,
Congress and the courts were also responsible for these regulatory failures. Where
regulated industries have so much power and influence over lawmakers, there is a lack of
political will to engage in vigorous regulation even when regulators perceive the dangers
of insufficient market place standards. 32 Nevertheless, IOSCO is now starting to build a
research capacity and to adopt a strategy emphasizing the need for securities regulators to
identify, monitor, and manage systemic risks.33
The IOSCO paper on mitigating systemic risk explains the tools available to
securities regulators that can reinforce the stability of the financial system. These tools
are "transparency and disclosure; business conduct oversight; organizational, prudential
and governance requirements; prevention of risk transmission" through rules regarding
trading infrastructure; and "emergency powers." 34 In addition, IOSCO, as an
international body of regulators, stressed "intra-jurisdictional communication and
exchange of information among regulators about systemic risk .. . to help prevent the
emergence of gaps in oversight and identify possible transfers of risk or cross-sectoral
risks." 3 5 Regulators were asked to leverage the work of other regulators and call on selfregulatory organizations to help, when applicable. 36 On the international level, securities
regulators were encouraged to continue their collaboration "through IOSCO to improve
transparency and disclosure in various international securities markets" and "be active

31. Id.at26-27.
32. Brooksley Born, chairman of the CFTC from 1996 to 1999, became aware of the speed at which the
over-the-counter derivatives market was growing and repeatedly tried to regulate it. In May of 1998, the CFTC
published a concept release and asked market participants and OTC derivative dealers for comments, but the
report was met with a strong negative reaction from other financial regulators. Then-Federal Reserve Chairman
Alan Greenspan and then-Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin were fiercely opposed to regulation and
recommended that Congress permanently strip the CFTC of regulatory authority over derivatives. See Peter S.
Goodman, Taking HardNew Look at a Greenspan Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8. 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/10/09/business/economy/09greenspan.html?pagewanted-print (analyzing how Greenspan's decisions
affected the financial markets).
33. MitigatingRisk, supra note 3, at 33.
34. Id. at 40.
35. Id at 49.
36. Id
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participants in international supervisory colleges." 37 The paper also recommended that
regulators promote confidence in markets through adequate communication about risk. 38
Since its onset, the financial crisis' causes have been widely debated, but the
consensus is that the main culprits are financial innovations creating leverage, such as
collateralized debt obligations, credit default swaps, and other structured investment
vehicles. 39 According to IOSCO:
[A] new framework for financial innovation [should] therefore include greater
consideration of the risks attached to innovations at the level of financial
institutions and regulators; close collaboration between supervisors and
regulators to consider the various potential impacts of innovations and transfers
of risk; implication for the resources of regulators needed to maintain
appropriate levels of surveillance and control; and consideration of the
international dimension of financial innovation in order to prevent regulatory
arbitrage. 4 0
IOSCO also urges securities regulators to periodically review their regulatory
coverage of financing activities to ensure that none escape appropriate regulation. 4 1
Regulators should do so by "regularly survey[ing] activity in the financial and
securities markets to understand the development in those markets and [to]
identify opportunities for cooperation and changes; set[ting] internal thresholds
for intervening in new and expanding markets and activities; and set[ting]
regulatory goals for intervention" [to] evaluate the appropriateness of and need
for such measures. 42
One of the key concerns of financial regulators in the wake of the crisis is the
shadow banking sector. This is of special importance to securities regulators since
shadow banking enterprises are not banks subject to supervision by others. 43 If such an
enterprise is considered a systemically important financial institution in the United States
by the Financial Stability Oversight Commission (FSOC), the enterprise will become
subject to regulation by the Federal Reserve Board." It is unclear whether large hedge
funds, for example, will fall into this category. IOSCO has recommended that, together
with prudential regulators, securities regulators should consider whether any action
should be taken with respect to shadow banking entities and activities, and if so, how the

37. Id.
38. MitigatingRisk, supranote 3, at 50.
39. See id at 51. Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) are investment-grade securities backed by a pool
of bonds, loans, and other assets. Credit default swaps (CDSs) are bilateral contracts designed for credit hedging
or speculative investment. Structured investment vehicles (SIVs) are operating finance companies set up to
profit from credit spreads between short-term debt and long-term structured finance products. Glossary,
UNIVERSITY OF IOWA CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT, http://blogs.law.uiowa.edul
ebook/uicifd-ebook/glossary (last visited June 22, 2012).
40. MitigatingRisk, supra note 3, at 51-52.
41. Id. at 53.
42. Id.
43. See Martin Arnold et al., Shadow Boxes, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 3. 2011, at 9; Gillian Tett, Road Map That
Brings Shadow Banking out into the Open, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2010, at 20.
44. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5464 (West 2010).
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monitoring and regulation should be carried out. 45
IOSCO's role is to provide guidance and develop policies and standards on when
and how to use the tools available to securities regulators. Its first commitment to this
effort is to build a research capacity that will initially focus on the research of systemic
risk and put forth an annual report to identify the most important systemic risks for
securities regulation at a global level. 46 IOSCO also intends to conduct risk analyses that
focus on risks in specific products, market segments, or technologies.4 7 Members are
encouraged to enter into a bilateral or multilateral "Memoranda of Understanding" to
address cooperation and collaboration on the global level, especially with regard to
sharing data and coordinating action on risks. 48 IOSCO has also engaged member-SROs
on specific risk topics since SROs are one step closer to the markets than their
supervisory authorities. 4 9 The organization is also considering holding stakeholder
consultation, where "IOSCO policy makers discuss their work program with
representatives of major industry organizations" and "organizing an intensive dialogue
with top-level industry groups to discuss important systemic risks." 50 "On certain topics,
IOSCO recognizes that it needs to work closely with other global bodies, such as the G-

20, FSB, BCBS, CPSS, IAIS, ESRB, IMF and World Bank and whe[n] appropriate,

[certain] domestic bodies." 51 Finally, another "activity that could be within the realm of
IOSCO's global work could be the improvement to transparency and disclosure through
setting standards for the collection of data and standardizing documentation relevant to
systemic risk." 52

45. MitigatingRisk, supra note 3, at 54.
46. Id at 57.
47. Id.
48. Id at 58.
49. Id
50. MitigatingRisk, supra note 3, at 54.
51. Id. The G-20 is made up of the finance ministers and central bank governors of 19 systemically
important industrialized and developing countries and the European Union. See generally G-20, THE GROUP OF
20: A HISTORY (2007), available at www.g20.utoronto.ca/docs/g20history.pdf. The Financial Stability Board
(FSB) was established in 2009 as an international body that monitors the global financial system and includes
the G-20 economies, members of the Financial Stability Forum, and the European Union. See generally FIN.
STABILITY BD. (Apr. 23, 2012), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org. The Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (BCBS) is a committee under the Bank of International Settlement (BIS) and comprises banking
supervisory authorities. See generally History of the Basel Committee and its Membership, BASEL COMMITTEE
ON BANKING SUPERVISION (Aug. 2009), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.pdf. The Committee on Payment and
Settlement Systems (CPSS), also a BIS committee, sets standards for payment and securities settlement
systems. See generally About BIS, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/cpss/index.htm (last
visited June 22, 2012). The International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) is a representative body
for insurance regulators and supervisors in approximately 190 jurisdictions. See About the IAIS, INT'L Ass'N OF
INs. SUPERVISORS, http://www.iaisweb.org/About-the-IAIS-28 (last visited June 22, 2012). The European
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) was established in 2010, in response to the financial crisis, by the European
Commission to ensure the macro-prudential supervision of EU's financial system. FRANK DIERICK ET AL.,
MACRO-PRUDENTIAL COMMENTARIES, THE ESRB AT WORK-IT's ROLE, ORGANISATION AND FUNCTIONING

(2012), available at http://www.esrb.europa.eulpub/pdf/commentaries/ESRBcommentary
52. MitigatingRisk, supra note 3, at 54.

1202.pdf.
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SYSTEMIC THREATS BY UNREGULATED ENTITIES AND VOLATILE MARKETS

A. Hedge Funds
The role of hedge funds in the securities markets is controversial, as are questions as
to how they were regulated in the past and how they should be regulated going forward.
Indeed, there is not even a generally accepted definition of a "hedge fund." The term
generally refers to pools of assets, usually securities, which are professionally managed
using innovative investment strategies, but are not registered and regulated like
traditional investment companies or undertakings. 53 Some market observers believe
hedge funds are mechanisms for greater market efficiency and more effective corporate
governance. 54 Others believe they are "conduits for fraud and market manipulation and
sources of systemic risk." 55 According to the Joint Forum, 56 although debates continue
over whether hedge funds may have contributed to the financial crisis, there is a general
consensus that they may have a systemic impact. 57 Certainly, the threat to the capital
markets that a hedge fund can pose has been apparent since the Long Term Capital
Management (LTCM) collapse of the late 1990s. 58 LTCM was an investment vehicle for
a number of hedge funds. Its portfolio was extraordinarily large and risky, and its offbalance sheet activities and its use of derivatives made its activities much more leveraged
and risky. When Russia devalued the ruble and declared a debt moratorium on August 17,
1998, LTCM became highly vulnerable to the market conditions that ensued, and by
September, it had lost almost 50 percent of its equity. 59 The Federal Reserve Board
intervened because of the systemic threat the collapse of LTCM would have posed to the
capital markets. 60 Although the Federal Reserve Board did not lend money to LTCM
itself, it facilitated a private sector recapitalization of LTCM composed of fourteen banks
and securities firms, which were LTCM's largest creditors. 61 Another more recent
example of the systemic risk posed by hedge funds is the two in-house hedge funds Bear
Steams was obliged to rescue, which some say was the beginning of the financial crisis of
53. Eddy Wymeersch, The Regulation ofPrivate Equity, Hedge Funds and State Funds 2 (Fin. Law Inst.,
Working Paper No. 2010-06, 2010).
54. Rene M. Stulz, Hedge Funds: Past, Present, and Future, 21 J. OF ECON. PERSP., 175, 180 (2007)
(hedge funds contribute to pushing securities prices towards fundamentals); STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 205 (2008) (hedge funds monitor corporate governance,

so investors believe in their increasing value).
55. Dan Awrey, The Limits of EU Hedge Fund Regulation, 5 LAW & FIN. MARKETS REV. 119, 121-22
(2011).
56. The Joint Forum is comprised of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, IOSCO, and the
International Association of Insurance Supervisors. Joint Forum, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS,
http://www.bis.orgfbcbs/jointforum.htm (last visited June 22, 2012).
57. THE JOINT FORUM, REVIEW OF THE DIFFERENTIATED NATURE AND SCOPE OF FINANCIAL
REGULATIONs-KEY ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (2010), availableat www.bis.org/publ/joint24.htm.
58. WILHELM HANKEL & ROBERT ISAAK, BRAVE NEW WORLD ECONOMY: GLOBAL FINANCE

THREATENS OUR FUTURE 72 (2011) (explaining that LTCM's collapse could have unraveled confidence in the
global financial system if the federal government had not coordinated the bailout of LTCM's bond hedge fund,
and stating that the lesson is that without regulation, money managers will take infinite risks with another's
capital); see also WILLIAM D. COHAN, HOUSE OF CARDS 244-53 (2009).
59. ROBERT E. WHALEY, DERIVATIVES: MARKETS, VALUATION, AND RISK MANAGEMENT 538 (2006).
60. HANKEL & ISAAK, supra note 58.

61.

Id.
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Although there is a general perception that hedge funds were not previously
regulated, this perception is not entirely valid. In the United Kingdom, hedge funds were
required to be authorized as investment managers and advisers and were then subject to
senior management arrangement, systems and controls, and conduct of business rules for
dealers and managers. 6 3 Elsewhere in Europe, hedge funds are restricted to private
offerings and subject to some regulation as to the conduct of their business. 64 Further,
hedge funds in the European Union (EU) have been subject to certain directives such as
the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive, 65 the Transparency Directive, 66 and the
Market Abuse Directive. 67 Nevertheless, most hedge funds operating in Europe operate
from offshore in order to limit the amount of regulation to which they are subject. 6 8
Similarly, in the United States, hedge funds have been subject to laws generally
applicable to traders in the securities markets, and they have generally been required to
limit their investors to "accredited investors" or "qualified purchasers." 69 Nevertheless,
prior to the financial crisis, hedge funds were not required to register with the SEC, and
they were not subject to regulation as to their business operations, capitalization, or
trading activities. 70 Although many hedge funds were nevertheless registered with the
SEC as investment advisers, and others were registered with the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC) as commodity pool operators, an SEC initiative to compel
hedge funds to become registered entities was challenged in the courts and was declared
beyond the SEC's authority. 71
In addition to concerns about hedge funds, regulators have also focused on two other
alternative investment vehicles: private equity funds 72 and sovereign wealth funds.7 3
Although there is no standard definition of a private equity fund, generally they are pools
of capital, which finance non-public companies, either start-ups or former public
companies, with a view toward managing the companies until they can be floated in the
public securities markets. 74 Questions as to whether these funds should be regulated in

62. See COHAN, supranote 58, at 92-94, 344-49.
63. Awrey, supra note 55, at 4 n. 10.
64. Wymeersch, supranote 53, at 5-8.
65. Council Directive 2004/39, 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1 (EC).
66. Council Directive 2004/109, 2004 O.J. (L 390) 38 (EC).
67. Council Directive 2003/6, 2003 O.J. (L 96) 16 (EC).
68. Awrey, supra note 55, at 10 n.55.
69. Hedge funds limit their investors to these two categories in order to avoid registering as an Investment
Company under the Investment Company Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-(3)(c)(1), (c)(7) (2006) (explaining
exceptions to registration as an investment company).
70. See generally Troy A. Paredes, Comm'r, SEC, Remarks at the George Washington University Law
School Symposium: Hedge Fund Regulation and Current Developments (June 8, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch060811tap.htm.
71. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 882-83 (9th Cir. 2006).
72. On June 22, 2011, the SEC adopted final rules to implement Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act
regarding investment advisers, notably including advisers to private funds, such as hedge funds and private
equity funds. 76 Fed. Reg. 39,646 (July 6, 2011); 76 Fed. Reg. 37,983 (June 29, 2011).
73. See generally Ethiopis Tafara, Dir., Office of International Affairs, Testimony Before the Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Apr. 24, 2008, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/
2008/ts0342408et.htm.
74. See Wymeersch, supranote 53, at 24 (explaining similar traits seen between private equity funds).

The Journalof CorporationLaw

858

[Vol. 37:4

the future, either like hedge funds or separately, have been discussed since the financial
crisis. 75 Sovereign wealth funds also are alternative investment vehicles, but regulatory
concerns and prohibitions have generally not focused on their systemic threats, but rather
on the political implications of their investment activities. 76
In response to the financial crisis, the G-20 has favored regulatory oversight over
hedge funds and hedge fund managers. However, in March 2009, the finance ministers of
the G-20 were not in full agreement on how to regulate hedge funds.7 7 Some European
countries wanted the funds to be overseen like banks, while the United States and United
Kingdom favored less intrusive regulation. 78 Europe later continued this debate with
respect to the Directive on Alternative Investment Fund Managers, which is discussed
below. 79 At the G-20 summits in Washington and London, the G-20 leaders "agreed that
all hedge fund managers should be registered and authori[z]ed by their national regulators
and that managers should report systemically relevant data to those regulators ... "80
In response to the G-20's policy decision, IOSCO issued a report on hedge fund
oversight in June 2009.81 IOSCO's definition of "hedge funds" refers to all investment
schemes displaying a combination of enumerated characteristics: 1) high levels of
leverage; 2) significant performance fees; 3) investors redeem their interests periodically;
4) significant investment by the manager; 5) speculation using derivatives and short
selling; and 6) more diverse risks or complex underlying products.8 2
Based on its own research, comments from the public, and inputs from industry
members, IOSCO recommended six high-level principles aimed at restoring investor
confidence through improved investor protection and better detection and avoidance of
the systemic and other regulatory risks posed by hedge funds. 83 As recognized by
IOSCO, the approach to hedge fund regulation needs to be balanced and measured, and
75. See generally Ethiopis Tafara Testimony, supranote 73.
76. Id. at 29-31. Because foreign governments manage these funds, and their activities often are
secretive, they are viewed with suspicion, but they also have been looked upon as possible providers of
financial and economic stability in the post-crisis world economy. See Press Release, Int'l Monetary Fund, New
Book Discusses Role of Sovereign Wealth Funds in the Post-Crisis World (May 13, 2011), available at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/sec/pr/201 1/prl I 178.htm (discussing the future role of sovereign wealth funds).
Yet, these funds are volatile. See Andrew Ward, Norway's Volatile Wealthy FundHits New Peak, FIN. TIMES,
Oct. 19, 2010, www.cnbc.com/id/39682463/print/l/displaymode/1098 (explaining the history of Norway's
sovereign wealth fund); Saed Azhar & Dinesh Nair, Analysis-Bulging Cash Balances, Sovereign Funds Set for
Deals, REUTERS, July 26, 2011, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/07/26/uk-sovereign-idUKTRE76PlAX
20110726 (identifying changes to sovereign wealth funds).
77. See France Is Threatening G20 Walkout, BBC, Mar. 31, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilbusiness/
7974190.stm (describing the different views of state leaders at the G-20 summit).
78. Id; see also Damien Paletta & Jonathan Weisman, Hedge-Fund Regulation Splits G-20 as
Conference Begins, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123699227525026981.html.
79. See generally Alternative Investments, EUR. COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eu/internal market/investment/
alternative investments en.htm (last visited June 22, 2012).
80. Press Release, Alternative Inv. Mgmt. Ass'n, EU Should Not Diverge from G-20 Path on Hedge Fund
Regulation (Apr. 22, 2010), availableat http://www.aima.org/en/media/press-releases.cfm/id/BF94 11D2-154B40D8-8BECIBAOF3496BDF.
81.

IOSCO, HEDGE FUND OVERSIGHT: FINAL REPORT (2009) [hereinafter HEDGE FUND OVERSIGHT],

available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD293.pdf (reporting on hedge fund oversight
listing high-level principles and feedback on public comments).
82. Id. 5.
83. Id. 1 22.

2012]

IOSCO's Response to the FinancialCrisis

859

the ultimate regulatory measures will require strong collective global action and
application. 84 The six principles are described below.
The first principle is that "hedge funds and/or hedge fund managers should be
subject to mandatory regulation." 85 According to IOSCO, industry structure should
dictate whether funds or their advisers should be subject to this additional layer of
regulation. 86 In any event, any regulatory oversight should be risk-based, proportional,
and more focused on systemically important hedge fund managers. 87 With the
information gathered through the registration process, regulators can gain adequate
insight into the hedge fund business and therefore be able to identify, analyze, and
mitigate possible systemic risks.8 8 Prospective investors, on the other hand, can use the
information to evaluate their investment options. 89
The second principle is that hedge fund managers and/or advisers "required to
register should also be subject to appropriate ongoing regulatory requirements relating to:
organizational and operational standards; conflicts of interest and other conduct of
business rules; disclosure to investors; and prudential regulation." 90 Organizational and
operational standards should take into account a comprehensive risk management
framework that considers risks from all facets of the fund managers' business (such as
market, liquidity, credit, and operational risks). 9 1 Managers should regularly monitor
these risks and make appropriate disclosure to investors. 92 There should be a strong and
independent compliance function, robust valuation process, adequate segregation and
protection of client monies and assets, and maintenance of funds' trading records.
Managers' business accounts should also be audited on an annual basis.93
Managers need to provide full disclosure about any conflicts of interest and how
they manage these conflicts. 94 Compensation structures should also be subject to strong
governance mechanisms to counter short-term profit motives. 9 5 IOSCO recommends
aligning standards for compensation structures to those developed by the Financial
Stability Board (FSB). 96 With regard to disclosure to investors, managers should disclose
information on risks, conditions and limits on redemption, existence of side letters and
gating structures, fund strategy and performance, and audited financial statements. 97
Regulators, in turn, should have the power to inspect the funds as well as the managers
and their records. 9 8 Finally, prudential requirements should be imposed on managers that
84. Id. 12, 18.
85. Id. M23-30.
86. HEDGE FUND OVERSIGHT, supra note 81, 125.
87. Id.127.
88. Id. 130.
89. Id.
90. Id M 31-38 (discussing the ongoing regulatory requirements to which hedge find managers and
advisors should be subject).
91. HEDGE FUND OVERSIGHT, supra note 81, 1 31.
92. Id.
93. Id
94. Id 32.
95. Id 33.
96. HEDGE FUND OVERSIGHT, supra note 81, 33; see supra note 51 (discussing various boards and
committees).
97. HEDGE FUND OVERSIGHT, supra note 81, $ 35.
98. Id 36.
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reflect the risks they take. 99 However, since not all IOSCO members are prudential
regulators, IOSCO recognizes that this principle needs to be further developed at a global
level.100

Principle three, discussed in the IOSCO paper on hedge funds, is that "prime brokers
and banks which provide funding to hedge funds should be subject to mandatory
registration/regulation and supervision. They should have in place appropriate risk
management systems and controls to monitor their counterparty credit risk exposures to
hedge funds." 101 IOSCO recommends that prime brokers and banks, both already subject
to conduct and prudential regulation, should have "strong risk management controls over
their exposures to hedge funds and an ability to obtain information from the funds to
engage in effective risk management." 1 02 Securities regulators, on the other hand, should
be able to obtain non-public information on these entities' most systemically significant
hedge fund counterparties. 10 3
The fourth principle is that hedge fund managers, advisers, and prime brokers should
provide to the relevant regulator information for systemic risk purposes. This should
include the identification, analysis, and mitigation of systemic risk. 104 Regulators should
attempt to collect information from these entities concerning the amount of credit
exposure to hedge funds; the aggregate and largest current exposures; potential
exposures; market or product concentrations on an individual or aggregate fund basis;
hedge fund managers with significant portions of the daily liquidity/volume of important
markets; prime brokers' and banks' aggregate margin requirements; cash loaned; the
value of long and short positions; and net equity. 10 5
Hedge fund managers and advisers should provide information on the funds they
manage, such as background on management, assets under management, services, fees,
strategies, and affiliates. 106 In addition, managers and advisers should also provide
information on their prime brokers and custodians, information on the manager's larger
funds, leverage and risk, counterparty risks, product exposure, and any type of
concentration. 107 These information requirements should be imposed on managers for all
the funds they manage, regardless of the location of the funds.10 8 The goal is to provide
regulators with enough information to identify sources of systemic risk that hedge funds
may pose.
Principle five is that regulators should encourage and take account of the
development, implementation, and convergence of industry good practices, where
appropriate. 10 9 The Technical Committee stated that it was committed to working with
the industry to develop a consolidated set of standards, and regulators should encourage

99.
100.
101.

Id. 37.
Id 1 38.
Id. 3.

102.

HEDGE FUND OVERSIGHT, supra note 81,

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

% 39-41.
Id. 42.
See id. 11 43-49 (explaining factors for identifying, analyzing, and mitigating systemic risks).
Id 44.
Id. 45.
HEDGE FUND OVERSIGHT, supra note 81, 146.
Id. 49.
See id. I 50-52 (discussing the need to develop a common set of industry standards).

2012]

IOSCO's Response to the FinancialCrisis

861

10
hedge funds and their managers to adhere to such sets of standards.o Regulators should
also consider and agree on how individual hedge funds and managers should assume and
comply with the standards.1 11
Finally, the sixth principle is that regulators should have the authority to cooperate
and share information with each other, when appropriate, in order to facilitate efficient
and effective oversight of globally active managers, advisers, and/or funds, and to help
identify systemic risks, market integrity, and other risks arising from the activities or
1 12
IOSCO
exposures of hedge funds with a view to mitigating such risks across borders.
expressed the view that securities regulators should have the authority to collect relevant
information from hedge funds on behalf of a foreign regulator; exchange on a timely and
on-going basis with relevant regulators on funds that may pose systemic risks; perform
joint inspections; and enforce and assist in enforcement against violators. 113 With regard
to exchanging information relevant to investigation and enforcement proceedings,
IOSCO recommends using its principles on the Multilateral Memorandum of
Understandings. As for the exchange of non-public supervisory information, the
Technical Committee should consider developing appropriate frameworks and principles
to assist regulators in doing so. 114
Important legislative developments with regard to hedge fund regulation in the
United States and the European Union followed the IOSCO report on hedge fund
oversight. While operating in a largely unregulated environment for years, American
hedge funds had grown and thrived in the absence of registration with the SEC and its
oversight. "In the United States, the amount of assets under hedge fund management
expanded from $100,000 in 1949 to $2 trillion in the summer of 2008; it subsequently
declined to approximately $1.5 trillion in 2009.115 Although hedge funds perform
important market functions-price discovery and the provision of liquidity . . . "16-they
lacked transparency. This made it difficult for investors, counterparties, and regulators to
evaluate the risks they posed. 1 17 The U.S. Congress set out to shed light in this area when
it enacted the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (DoddFrank), 118 which requires most hedge funds to register with the SEC and become subject
to SEC examination and regulation. To keep it sufficiently encompassing, no bodies have
defined the term "hedge fund," including IOSCO, the SEC, nor Congress in its enactment

110. Id.152.
111. Id.
53-57 (discussing the cooperation between national
112. See HEDGE FuND OVERSIGHT, supra note 81,
regulators to mitigate cross-border risk).
113. Id 54.
114. Id. 55.
115. Orice M. Williams, Dir. of Fin. Mkts. & Cmty. Inv., Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Capital
Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises, Gov't Accountability Office (2009), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09677t.pdf.
116. Roberta S. Karmel, The New Landscape ofInvestment Adviser Custody, 43 REV. SEC. & COMM. REG.
295, 295 (Dec. 15, 2010).
117. Louis Aguilar, Comm'r, SEC, Speech at the 2009 Hedgeworld Fund Services Conference: Hedge
Fund Regulation on the Horizon-Don't Shoot the Messenger (June 18, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch061809laa.htm.
118. Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Ill Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010)
[hereinafter Dodd-Frank].
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of Dodd-Frank. 119 For purposes of the U.S. securities laws, "[t]his term generally refers
to investment vehicles that [] pool [] securities, and perhaps other assets, [and] whose
interests are not sold in a registered public offering and that are not registered as
investment companies under the Investment Company Act of 1940" (Investment
Company Act).12 0 Dodd-Frank uses the statutory term "private investment funds." Such
a fund is "an issuer that would be an investment company, as defined in section 3 of the
Investment Company Act of 1940 ... but for section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of that Act." 1 2 1
This bit of legislative complexity refers to the exemptions from registration for funds
with fewer than 100 investors or funds with investors who are all "qualified
purchasers"-generally any natural person with assets of at least $5 million or any
adviser who owns or invests on a discretionary basis at least $25 million. 122 The term
"private investment funds" includes hedge funds, but it also encompasses private equity
funds, venture capital funds, and some other vehicles. 123
Section 403 of Dodd-Frank requires all "private funds" to register as investment
advisers with the SEC one year after its enactment, except for any investment adviser that
is registered as a commodity trading adviser with the CFTC and advises a private
fund. 124 Nevertheless, if after the enactment of Dodd-Frank, the business of such a
commodity trading adviser "should become predominantly the provision of securitiesrelated advice," that adviser needs to register with the SEC.1 25 The term "predominantly
the provision of securities-related advice" is not defined in Dodd-Frank, but the term
"predominantly engaged in financial activities" is defined as 85% of consolidated gross
revenues and assets. 12 6 It therefore is likely the SEC will interpret the concept of
predominantly engaged in securities-related advice similarly. Advisers to small business
investment companies, venture capital funds, and family offices also are exempt from
SEC registration and regulation.127 The SEC passed rules with regard to the obligations
of hedge funds to register, but it pushed off the registration requirement until March 30,
2012.128
Congress was determined to bring hedge funds within the ambit of SEC regulation
in Dodd-Frank for two reasons. First, although the majority of investors in most hedge
funds are sophisticated and fall within the definition of an "accredited investor," and
many are "qualified purchasers," abuses and insolvencies by some hedge funds have
SCotT J. LEDERMAN, FINANCIAL PRODUCT FUNDAMENTALS § 11:2 (Practicing Law Institute 2011).
120. Karmel, supra note 116; see STAFF REPORT TO THE U.S. SEC, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF
HEDGE FUNDS 1, 3 (Sept. 2003), available at www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf.
119.

121. Dodd-Frank § 402.
122. GERALD T. LINS ET AL., HEDGE FUNDS AND OTHER PRIVATE FUNDS: REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE
§ 4:33 (2011).
123. See generally Andre J. Donohue, Dir., SEC Div. of Inv. Mgmt., Keynote Address at the 9th Annual
International Conference on Private Investment Funds (Mar. 10, 2008).
124. Dodd-Frank § 403.
125. Id.
126. Id. § 102(a)(6).
127. Id.§ §403, 407.
128. See Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, Inv. Advisers Act Rel.
No. 3221, 76 Fed. Reg. 42,950, 42,976 n.378-79 (July 19. 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275, 279); see
also Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Dodd-Frank Act Amendments to Investment Advisers Act (June 22,
2011). In part, this was due to the technical complexities of the new registration requirements, coupled with the
deregistration requirements for mid-sized hedge funds.
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demonstrated that investor protection is an issue. 129 Second, hedge funds may pose a
130
systemic risk as a result of either their size or trading methods.
Once hedge funds register with the SEC, they will be subject to new obligations
applicable to all registered advisers. They will be required to appoint a chief compliance
officer, establish a code of ethics, and comply with custody and record keeping
requirements. 13 1 Although the SEC is given rule making authority to specify what
records need to be prepared and maintained, 132 certain records are specified in DoddFrank: the amount of assets under management and use of leverage, including off balance
sheet items; counterparty risk exposure; trading and investment positions; valuation
policies and practices of the fund; types of assets held; side arrangements or side letters;
133
Further, all
and such other information deemed necessary by the SEC and the FSOC.
34
registered funds will be subject to periodic and special examinations by the SEC.1
Dodd-Frank included a provision granting the SEC the right not to disclose records
or information obtained through its risk assessment, surveillance, or other regulatory and
135
The
oversight functions of each type of firm regulated under the securities laws.
reason for this provision was that hedge funds will be a new financial institution that the
SEC will oversee, and hedge funds have been concerned that their proprietary trading
information could become available to competitors after they are compelled to disclose
such information to the SEC. The purpose of the provision was to put the SEC on a par
with bank regulators when conducting examinations. 136 This provision became
controversial because Fox News and some members of Congress claimed that it would
129. A variety of common fact patterns involving hedge funds (or putative hedge funds) have resulted in
SEC enforcement actions. One type of case is the Ponzi scheme where a firm is purporting to be a hedge fund,
but the firm or its promoter is instead pocketing the funds it raises. The most high profile of these cases was the
Madoff case. SEC v. Madoff, 2009 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,070 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2009) (summarizing
the allegations against Madoff); see also SEC v. Stanford Int'l Bank., Lit. Rel. No. 20901 (Feb. 17, 2009)
(referencing Madoff's "massive Ponzi scheme"). A closely related type of case is the misrepresentation of
investment returns to investors in hedge funds based on inaccurate portfolio valuations. E.g., SEC v. Nicholson,
Lit. Rel. No. 20911 (Feb. 25, 2009) (outlining the SEC's allegations against the alleged perpetrators of such a
scheme); Amanda Cantrell, What Happenedat Bayou, CNNMONEY.COM, Sept. 29, 2009, http://money.cnn.com
/2005/09/29/markets/bayouinvestors/index.htm (describing another instance of such hedge fund fraud). Insider
trading cases involving hedge funds have been both high profile and more routine. E.g., United States v.
Rajaratnam, 802 F. Supp. 2d 491 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). The SEC has also brought cases against hedge funds for
short selling abuses. See, e.g., Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Dallas-Based Hedge Fund Adviser for
Participating in Stock Offerings After Selling Short, No. 2010-172 (Sept. 23, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-172.htm (describing charges brought by the SEC against a hedge
fund advisor for selling short). In the five-year period from 2004 to 2009, the SEC brought over 100 cases
involving hedge funds. Elisse B. Walter, Comm'r, SEC, Testimony Before the United States House of
Representatives Committee on Financial Services (Mar. 20, 2009).
130. For an example, see U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-00-3, LONG-TERM CAPITAL
MANAGEMENT: REGULATORS NEED TO Focus GREATER ATTENTION ON SYSTEMIC RISK (Oct. 1999), available

at http://www.gao.gov/assets/230/228446.pdf.
131. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 275.204-2, 204A-1, 206(4)-2, 206(4)-7 (2010).
132. Dodd-Frank §404 (2010), amending Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.A. § 806-4 (2006).
133. Id.
134. Investment Advisers Act §204(b)(6), amended by Dodd-Frank § 404.
135. Dodd-Frank §9291.
136. Bruce Carton, Does Dodd-Frank Exempt SEC From Most FOIA Requests?, COMPLIANCE WEEK
(July 28, 2010), http://www.complianceweek.com/does-dodd-ftank-exempt-sec-from-most-foia-requests/
article/188332/.
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allow the SEC to deny requests for information in order to shield itself from public
criticism. 137 The Senate and House therefore passed bills repealing this Dodd-Frank
provision and replacing it with an expanded exemption from the Freedom of Information
Act disclosure to include hedge funds in the protection of the exemption for matters that
are "contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by,
on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of
financial institutions."1 38
Once hedge funds are SEC registered advisers, they will be required to safeguard
client assets over which the advisers have custody, including but not limited to
verification of such assets by an independent public accountant. 139 This statutory
provision is in response to the Madoff scandal and intends to reduce the dangers of Ponzi
schemes and thefts. 14 0 It is in line with SEC rulemaking passed as a result of the Madoff
scandal. 141
In addition to investor protection, Dodd-Frank also aims to reduce the potential
systemic risk hedge funds pose to the broader financial system as illustrated by the Long
Term Capital situation. 142 The main tool in the regulatory arsenal provided by DoddFrank is that hedge funds could become subject to supervision as nonbank financial
companies if regulators determine that they pose a threat to the financial stability of the
U.S. capital markets. 14 3 This would happen if the FSOC, by a two-thirds vote, including
a vote of the Secretary of the Treasury as Chair, determines that such a threat exists. 144
Further, if a hedge fund is a securities holding company that is the parent of a brokerdealer required by foreign law to be subject to consolidated regulation, the hedge fund
might be required to register with the Federal Reserve Board and be subject to Federal
supervision. 14 5
The European Union also has adopted a new regime for the regulation of alternative
investment funds (AIFs), including hedge funds, and alternative investment fund
managers (AIFM), that in some respects overlaps with the new U.S. regulatory scheme,
but in other ways conflicts with the Dodd-Frank framework. 14 6 The Directive on
Alternative Investment Fund Managers (AIFMD) generated extensive controversy, not
137. Id.
138. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 522(b)(8) (2007); see Freedom of Information Act sec. 3717,
111th Cong. (2010) (amending to insert provisions applying the Freedom of Information Act). President Obama
signed this bill on Oct. 5, 2010. Freedom of Information Act, Ill Pub. L. No. 257, 124 Stat. 2646 (2010).
139. Dodd-Frank § 411.
140. See generally infra note 141.
141. Investment Advisers Act Rel. No. 2968 (Dec. 30, 2009), 75 Fed. Reg. 1456 (Jan. 11, 2010), amending
Rule 206(4)-2, 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2 (2008); see Mari-Anne Pisarri, The New Landscape of Investment
Adviser Custody, 43 REv. SEC. & COMM. REG. 103 (Apr. 21, 2010) (describing the protections of the Advisers
Act).
142. SEC Proposes Private Fund Systemic Risk Reporting Rule, U.S. SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N (Jan. 25,
2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-23.htm.
143. Dodd-Frank § 113.
144. CHRIS DODD, CHAIRMAN, SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOuS., & URBAN AFFAIRS, SUMMARY:
RESTORING AMERICAN FINANCIAL STABILITY (2010), available at http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/
FinancialReformSummaryAsFiled.pdf.
145. Dodd-Frank § 618.
146. Peter Green & Jeremy Jennings-Mare, Comparison of Dodd Frank Act and EU Regulatory Reform,
MORRISON & FOERSTER (2011), http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/Reg-Reform-PPT.pdf
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only within Europe, but between Europe and the United States. The European Parliament
approved the AIFMD in November 2010, but it was not finally published until July 1,
2011.147 The AIFMD does not directly regulate the funds, but, as in the United States, it
imposes registration requirements and regulatory responsibilities on the managers of
AIFs. 14 8 Also, as in the United States, the directive applies essentially to all collective
investment funds that are not regulated funds or UCITS.1 49 Nevertheless, the United
States and the European Union part company with regard to some of the substantive
requirements imposed upon AlFs.
Managers of AIFs must be authorized in the home state of the AIF, or if the AIFM is
150
In order to be
not based in the European Union, in the most appropriate member state.
authorized, the AIFM must comply with various requirements, including capital
requirements and the requirements to have a depository for the assets under
152
a requirement for
management. 15 1 The Directive also has conduct of business rules,
15 4
153
transparency 1 55 and
restrictions on delegation,
independent asset valuation,
157
and five
disclosure requirements, 156 restrictions on remuneration of senior staff,
158
Once
percent "skin in the game" requirements for investing in securitizations.
59
authorized, the manager has a passport to sell the AIF throughout Europe.1
The issue of regulation of "third country funds" has been contentious. A non-EU
manager will be permitted to manage EU domiciled AlFs and market non-EU domiciled
AIFs subject to certain restrictions and agreements between the European Union and the
home regulator of the AIF.1 60 There are complicated phase-in requirements for non-EU
domiciled AlFs beginning in 2013 that could disadvantage non-EU domiciled AIFS then
and now. 16 1 During the debating and drafting of the AIFMD, bitter disputes broke out
between the EU authorities and U.S. regulators, especially the U.S. Secretary of the
Treasury, who claimed that the directive was protectionist. 162 Although the final form of
the AIFMD has resolved some of these tensions, final regulations have not yet been put
147. Council Directive 2011/61,2011 O.J. (L 174)1 (EC).
148. Implementation of the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (Fin. Servs. Auth., Discussion
Paper No. DP12/1, Jan. 2012), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/FsaWeb/Shared/Documents/pubs/
discussion/dpl2-01.pdf.
149. UCITS refers to "Undertakings for Collective Investments in Transferable Securities." They are EU
registered and regulated investment funds similar to U.S. investment companies. See Council Directive
2001/107, 2001 O.J. (L 41) 1 (EC); Council Directive 2001/108, 2001 O.J. (L 41) 1 (EC) (describing the
features of UCITS).
150. See Council Directive 2011/61, 2011 O.J. (L 174) 10 (EC).
151. See Council Directive 2011/61, art. 18, 2011 O.J. (L 174) 4,31 (EC).
152. The conduct of business rules cover conflicts of interest, risk management, and liquidity management.
See Council Directive 2011/61, art. 13, 2011 O.J. (L 174) 12, 24 (EC).
153. Council Directive 2011/61, art. 18, 2011 O.J. (L 174) 1, 26 (EC).
154. Id at art. 20.
155. Id at art. 22.
156. Id. at art. 23.
157. Id. at art. 13.
158. Council Directive 2011/61, art. 17, 2011 O.J. (L 174) 1, 26 (EC).
159. Council Directive 2011/61, art. 35, 2011 O.J. (L 174) 42 (EC).
160. Council Directive 2011/61, 2011 O.J. (L 174) 9 (EC).
161. See generally id. at 1-2.
162. James Politi, Geithner Urges EU FundRules Rethink, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2010, http://www.ft.com/
cms/s/0/00591036-41bb- I df-865a-00144feabdcO.html#axzzlWWr4Q91Z.
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into place.1 63 The European Commission needs to develop numerous detailed rules in
order to implement the AIFMD. 1 64 This challenge is similar to that facing the SEC in
implementing Dodd-Frank. The Commission has asked the European Securities Market
Authority1 65 (ESMA) for draft advice and that advice is voluminous. 166
Asian jurisdictions also have been developing new regulations for hedge funds.
Hong Kong requires hedge funds to register with its financial regulator, the Securities and
Futures Commission (SFC).1 67 Recently, the SFC has focused on increasing its
enforcement efforts by stepping up its inspections of registered funds. 168 On June 25,
2011, the SFC also implemented increased disclosure rules that require SFC registered
funds to provide investors with a product key facts statement and an offering document
that satisfy a number of additional disclosure requirements as set out in the SFC
Handbook, which came into effect a year ago. 169 Singapore, a direct competitor to Hong
Kong, has also been vying for hedge fund business and is attempting to make it easier for
hedge funds to operate there. 170 As part of an attempt to attract start-up hedge funds, the
Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) approved rules in April 2010, exempting funds
with less than $250 million ($183 million USD) from registration so long as the fund
serves 30 or fewer "qualified" investors. 17 1
Whether the standards enunciated by IOSCO will serve to harmonize hedge fund

163. Non-EU hedge fund managers may be able to continue to market non-EU AIFs to professional
investors under member states' private placement regimes. The EU AIFM must comply with all of the
provisions in the AIFMD except the depositary requirements, there must be cooperation arrangements in place,
and the non-EU AIF must not be established in a jurisdiction that is designated as non-cooperative by FATF.
Additionally, Member States may impose stricter marketing requirements on the EU AIFM. Council Directive
2011/61, art. 34-40, 2011 O.J. (L 174) 1, 42-54 (EC).
164. Sheila Nicoll, Dir. of Conduct Policy, Fin. Serv. Auth., Speech at the PWC Global Alternative
Investments Seminar: The Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive-ESMA's Draft Technical Advice
to the European Commission (July 21, 2011), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/
speeches/2011/0721_sn.shtml.
165. "ESMA is an independent EU Authority that contributes to safeguarding the stability of the European
Union's financial system by ensuring the integrity, transparency, efficiency and orderly functioning of securities
markets, as well as enhancing investor protection. In particular, ESMA fosters supervisory convergence both
amongst securities regulators, and across financial sectors by working closely with the other European
Supervisory Authorities." About ESMA, EUR. SEC. & MKTS. AUTH., http://www.esma.europa.eu/ (last visited
June 20, 2012).
166. ESMA's advice regarding the AIFMD is over 400 pages long, and it is outside the scope of this
Article to summarize the advice. It is worthy to note, however, that the ESMA provided the most comments in
the areas of depository requirements, transparency, and leverage. See Draft Technical Advice to the European
Commission on PossibleImplementing Measuresof the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive, EUR.
SEC. & MKTS. AUTH. (July 2011), http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/2011_209.pdf (continuing
implementation advice).
167. Helena Chan, SFC to Balance Investor Protectionas Hedge Funds Stampede Hong Kong, THOMSON
REUTERS ACCELUS, May 14, 2011, http://www.complinet.com/dodd-frank/news/analysis/article/sfc-to-balanceinvestor-protection-as-hedge-funds-stampede-hong-kong.html.
168. Id
169. HONG KONG SEC. & FUTuREs COMM'N, QUARTERLY REPORT 3 (Apr.-June 2011), available at
http://www.sfc.hk/sfc/doc/EN/speeches/public/quartely/apr jun1 .pdf.
170. Netty Ismail, Singapore'sNew Hedge-FundRegulation Puts City 'Back on Map', BLOOMBERG, July
28, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-28/singapore-hedge-fund-regulations-lure-managers-putcity-back-on-the-map-.html.
171. Id.
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regulation around the world remains an open question, especially since differences have
emerged between United States and EU regulation of the funds, and Asian markets are
attempting to attract hedge funds into their markets. Although the mature capital markets
are following IOSCO's principles with regard to hedge funds by requiring their
registration and regulation, it does not follow that such regulation will be consistently
formulated or applied.
B.

Credit Rating Agencies

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) examined the financial and
economic crisis of 2008 and explained its causes. The FCIC concluded that "the failures
of credit-rating agencies were essential cogs in the wheel of financial destruction" and
"[t]he three dominant credit rating agencies were key enablers of the financial
meltdown." 172 Although criticism of the conduct and competence of credit-rating
agencies (CRAs) after 2008 focused on the huge number of rating agencies' write downs
of previously highly rated residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and
collateralized-debt obligations (CDOs) in the context of the sub-prime mortgage crisis,
intense scrutiny of CRAs has been ongoing in the United States and overseas since at
least the collapse of Enron. 173 Even earlier, the rating agencies' failure to anticipate the
1997-1998 Asian debt crisis adversely impacted sovereign debt issues. 174
CRAs analyze and evaluate the creditworthiness of corporate and sovereign issuers
of debt securities. 175 While CRA ratings are often thought to represent a judgment on the
worthiness of an investment because of the use of the term "investment grade" to refer to
highly rated securities, the CRAs' opinions merely assess the likelihood that a particular
debt security will perform according to its terms. 176 A high credit rating does not purport
to be an opinion that the debt instrument is a good investment. 177 Nevertheless, specific
references to credit ratings, in the rules of the SEC and the Basel II and Basel III accords
as a surrogate for the riskiness of investments held by regulated entities, gave such
ratings significance and credibility as a measure of the creditworthiness of issuers.1 In
172. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES, at

xxv (2011) [hereinafter FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY], available at www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/
GPO-FCIC.pdf.
173. Major CRAs persistently rated Enron's debt as "investment grade" until four days before Enron
declared bankruptcy. Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 43, 43 (2004).
Similarly, WorldCom was rated "investment grade" three months before filing for bankruptcy, and Global
Crossing was rated "investment grade" in March 2002 and then defaulted on loans in July 2002. Letter from
Egan-Jones Ratings Company, to Jonathan G. Katz, SEC Secretary (Nov. 10, 2002), availableat www.sec.gov/
news/extra/credrate/eganjones2.htm.
174. Id
175. Marwan Elkhoury, Credit Rating Agencies and Their Potential Impact on Developing Countries,
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, No. 186 (Jan. 2008), http://archive.unctad.org/en/
docs/osgdp2008 1 en.pdf.
176. TECHNICAL COMM. OF IOSCO, THE ROLE OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN STRUCTURED FINANCE
MARKETS 4 (2008) [hereinafter IOSCO ROLE OF CRAs], available at www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/
pdf/IOSCOpd270.pdf.
177. Id.
178. See SEC, REPORT ON THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES IN THE OPERATION OF
THE SECURITIES MARKETS 5 (2003) [hereinafter SARBANES-OXLEY REPORT], availableat http://www.sec.gov/
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1975, the SEC adopted the term "nationally recognized statistical rating organization"
(NRSRO) to determine capital charges for broker-dealers for purposes of the SEC's
capital adequacy or net capital rule. 179 Marketplace and regulatory reliance on credit
ratings then gradually increased, and the concept of an NRSRO became embedded in a
wide range of U.S. regulations of financial institutions, as well as state, federal, and
foreign laws relating to creditworthiness. 180 The failure of the CRAs to promptly adjust
ratings or forecast the demise of issuers that went bankrupt when the stock market
technology bubble burst then led to scrutiny of their performance and lack of government
regulation.
The SEC never passed a rule defining NRSROs, but rather recognized agencies as
such through a no-action letter process.1 8 1 The SEC staff considered a number of factors,
the most important of which was that the agency was "nationally recognized" for ratings
reliability.182 This opaque process and the highly concentrated number of NRSROs led to
criticism of the SEC's procedures, but government regulation of CRAs was too
controversial to result in legislation. Some believed that the NRSRO designation was a
barrier to competition in the credit-rating business. 183 Others argued that the SEC lacked
authority to substantively regulate CRAsl 84 and that such authority would be
inappropriate because the activities of CRAs are journalistic and protected by the First
Amendment. 185 Yet, shortcomings by CRAs raised questions as to whether their lack of
regulation and the SEC's process for designating NRSROs was appropriate. Accordingly,
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002186 mandated that the SEC study the role and function of
CRAs and submit a report to Congress. 187 This study was required to cover the following
areas: the role of CRAs in evaluating issuers; the importance of that role to investors and
the markets; impediments to accurate appraisals of the financial resources and risks of
securities issuers; barriers to entry to the CRA business; measures to improve
dissemination of CRA appraisals; and conflicts of interest in rating operations. The SEC
issued this required report, but it did not draw any firm conclusions concerning how, if at
all, CRAs should be regulated. Instead, the SEC stated that it intended to issue a concept

news/studies/credratingreport0103.pdf (describing credit agencies' role); BASEL COMM. ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING
SYSTEMS (2010), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl89.pdf.
179.

SARBANEs-OXLEY REPORT, supra note 178, at 6.

180. Id. at 7-8.
18 1. See Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and Its Discontents: The Dynamics of Financial Product
Development,29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553, 1696 (2008) (discussing problems with securitization).
182. Hill, supra note 173, at 55. Other factors taken into consideration were organizational structure, size,
and experience of staff, the agency's independence from the company it rates, and internal procedures to
prevent misuse of inside information. Id. at 55-56.
183. E.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Private OrderingofPublic Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox, 2002 U.
ILL. L. REv. 1, 20 (2002) (noting that the NRSRO designation blocks competition among rating agencies
because it limits the number of agencies).
184. As will be explained, some authority was given to the SEC in the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act
of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327 (2006).
185. Rating Agencies and the Use of Credit Ratings Under the Federal Securities Law, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-47972, 80 SEC Docket 1003 (June 4, 2003) [hereinafter Rating Agencies Concept Release].
186. 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2002).
187. The SEC was to file the report not less than 180 days after the passage of the Act. Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 702, 16 Stat. 745 (2002).
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release covering the following issues: mandating disclosure by NRSROs about the ratings
process and other matters; conflicts of interest; anti-competitive or unfair practices;
reducing barriers to entry; and ongoing SEC oversight of CRAs. 188 The SEC duly issued
this concept release in June 2003.189
In the meantime, the Technical Committee of IOSCO formed a task force to study
issues relating to CRAs and issued a report in September 2003 describing the role of
CRAs in the global capital market. 190 This task force was chaired by a commissioner of
the SEC and included representatives from Australia, Brazil, France, Germany, Hong
Kong, Italy, Japan, Ontario, Canada, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. 191 At the
same time, IOSCO published a set of principles that regulators, CRAs, and other market
participants could follow to improve the integrity of the ratings process and help ensure
that investors are provided with timely, high quality ratings. 192 These principles were
generic and related to the quality and integrity of the ratings process, independence and
conflicts of interest, transparency and timeliness of ratings disclosure, and the use of
confidential information.1 93
In response to criticism that these principles were insufficient to address the
problems posed by CRAs, particularly in light of credit ratings' role in Basel II, IOSCO
continued to analyze the regulation of CRAs. 194 In September 2003, IOSCO issued a
report on the activities of CRAs and a Code of Conduct Fundamentals for CRAs. 195 In
contrast to the earlier published principles, the Code of Conduct Fundamentals was much
more specific. It focused on the quality of the ratings process, including updating of
opinions, conflicts of interest, employee and analyst independence, and transparency. 19 6
In response, Moody's and Standard & Poor's published their own Code of Professional
Conduct in the second half of 2005.197
The U.S. Congress then passed the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act (CRA Reform
Act) in 2006, which established a system of registration and regulation of NRSROs and
instructed the SEC to formulate implementing rules. 198 The CRA Reform Act led to three
changes in the SEC's regulation of NRSROs. First, the Act contained new definitions of
"credit rating," "credit rating agency," "nationally recognized statistical rating
188.
189.
190.

SARBANES-OXLEY REPORT, supra note 178, at 43-45.

Rating Agencies Concept Release, supra note 185.
TECHNICAL COMM. OF IOSCO, REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 15-17
[hereinafter REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIEs], available at www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/

(2003)
IOSCOPDI53.pdf.
191. Id. at I n.3. The three largest international CRAs-Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and Fitch-are all
U.S. companies. Id. at 8.
192. IOSCO, IOSCO STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES REGARDING THE ACTIVITIES OF CREDIT RATING
AGENCIES (2003), availableat www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPDI 51 .pdf.
193. Id.
194. See Karmel & Kelley, supra note 26, at 927.
195. See REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES, supra note 190 (reporting on the activities of credit rating agencies);
IOSCO, CODE OF CONDUCT FUNDAMENTALS FOR CREDIT RATING AGENCIES: ANNEX A (2008), available at
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD271.pdf (including the code of conduct fundamentals).
196. See Karmel & Kelley, supra note 26, at 927.
197. Marwan Elkhoury, Credit Rating Agencies and Their PotentialImpact on Developing Countries 12
(UNCTAD, Discussion Paper No. 186, UNCTAD/OSG/DP/2008/l, 2008).
198. Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-291, 120 Stat. 1327 (2006)
(implementing SEC rules that were issued in June 2007).
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organization," and "person associated" with an NRSRO. 19 9 Second, it introduced a new
registration procedure for recognition of NRSROs and imposed substantive requirements
on NRSROs with respect to misuse of non-public information, conflicts of interest, and
anti-competitive or abusive conduct. 200 Third, it amended the Exchange Act, subjecting
NRSROs to the SEC's recordkeeping and reporting requirements. 20 1 This statute,
however, did not allow the SEC to regulate "the substance of credit ratings or the
procedures and methodologies by which any [NRSRO] determines credit ratings." 202 It
also made clear that it did not provide for a private right of action against the rating
agency. 203
In June 2007, the SEC promulgated rules implementing the CRA Reform Act,
elaborating on the basic registration requirements for NRSROs and obligations to update
registration forms. 204 The rules subjected NRSROs to recordkeeping and annual financial
reporting rules, 205 and required NRSROs to establish procedures to prevent the misuse of
confidential information and to manage conflicts of interest. 206 Finally, NRSROs were
prohibited from certain anti-competitive or abusive practices relating to tying the
issuance or level of a credit rating to an issuer's purchase of services or products in
addition to the credit rating. 207
IOSCO continued to tackle the challenges posed by CRAs. In March 2008, IOSCO
issued a consultation report on the role of CRAs in structured finance markets, as well as
a new Code of Professional Conduct. 208 This new code did not propose any major
changes, so the European financial commissioner at the time called it "toothless" and
began pushing for EU regulation of CRAs. 209 In reaction to this development, and in
response to the financial crisis, IOSCO issued a paper on international cooperation in the
oversight of CRAs. 2 10
In that paper, IOSCO expressed the view that as more jurisdictions adopt regulations
for the oversight of CRAs in response to the financial crisis, regulatory fragmentation
199. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 3(a)(62), 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78(a)-(Pp) (2009).
200. Id § 15(E).
201. Id. § 17(a).
202. Frank Partnoy, Rethinking Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies: An Institutional Investor
Perspective 6 (San Diego Legal Studies, Paper No. 09-014, 2009), available at http://papers.ssm.com/
sol3/papers.cfn?abstract id=1430608.
203. Id.
204. Application for Registration as a Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organization, 17 C.F.R. §
240.17g-1 (2007).
205. Records to be Made and Retained by Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, 17
C.F.R. § 240.17g-2 (2007); Annual Financial Reports to be Furnished by Nationally Recognized Statistical
Rating Organizations, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-3 (2007).
206. Prevention of Misuse of Material Nonpublic Information, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-4 (2007); Conflicts of
Interest, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17g-5 (2007).
207. Prohibited Acts and Practices, 17 C.F.R. § 17g-6 (2007).
208. See IOSCO ROLE OF CRAs, supra note 176 (reporting on the role of credit rating agencies in
structured finance markets).
209. See Tony Barber, Bloc Turns up Heat on RatingAgencies, FIN. TIMES, July 8, 2008, at 3; Gillian Tett,
Unease as Regulators Callfor More Controlover Ratings System, FIN. TIMES, June 25, 2008, at 25.
210. TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE IOSCO, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN OVERSIGHT OF CREDIT
RATING AGENCIES (2009) [hereinafter IOSCO INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION], available at www.iosco.org/
library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD287.pdf.
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among jurisdictions is of concern. 2 11 To that end, IOSCO expressed the view that the
most effective approach to avoid such fragmentation was to enhance cross-border
cooperation among national regulators with powers to inspect and oversee CRAs. 212
Such an approach would allow members to remain primarily responsible for CRA
activities that occurred within their jurisdictions, while regulators with concurrent
jurisdiction could cooperate on devising regulations and overseeing CRA activities. 213
This approach would also allow regulators to achieve more efficient regulation,
streamline the monitoring and surveillance of CRAs by sharing information on CRAs'
activities in foreign jurisdictions, and permit a greater degree of cross-border regulatory
efficiency, particularly for jurisdictions that might not directly regulate CRAs. 2 14
In an effort to facilitate the sharing of information among members, IOSCO's CRA
Task Force developed a confidential model examination module for members with
examination authority. 2 15 The module offers a baseline set of information about CRAs
that would be of interest to an examiner, thus providing basic guidance on what type of
information individual regulators should expect to share with a counterpart. 2 16 In
addition, IOSCO announced that it had converted the CRA Task Force into a permanent
standing committee in order to continue to assist securities regulators' effort in
overseeing CRAs. 2 17 The main functions of the Standing Committee are to consider
regulatory and policy initiatives regarding CRA activities and to facilitate dialogue
between securities regulators and the CRA industry. 218
In November 2009, the European Union published a regulation requiring the
registration and oversight of CRAs. 2 19 Under this regulation, all EU-established CRAs
are required to seek authorization from relevant national authorities, and EU entities may
only use the credit ratings issued by such CRAs. 220 A subsequent regulation augmented
this regulation in May 2011, which is described below. 22 1
The United States then passed Dodd-Frank, which increased the SEC's regulatory
responsibilities with respect to CRAs and provided for heightened transparency of rating
methodologies in structured and non-structured financial products. 22 2 Among other

211. Id. at 3.
212. Id.
213. See Karmel & Kelley, supranote 26, at 927.
214. "Possible mechanisms" for carrying out enhanced cross-border cooperation include bilateral
arrangements and a college of regulators. Id. Bilateral agreements could provide more robust joint oversight of
specific CRAs and could be more tailored to address specific regulatory concerns. A "college of regulators," on
the other hand, should incorporate certain membership criteria to ensure that the size of the college remains
manageable, that the most significant CRA regulators are part of the college, and that all participants are legally
able to share information with one another. IOSCO INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, supra note 210, at 4.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 5.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Commission Regulation 1060/2009, 2009 O.J. (L 302) (EC) (focusing on credit rating agencies).
220. IOSCO, REGULATORY IMPLEMENTATION OF STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES REGARDING ACTIVITIES OF
CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 11 (May 2010), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCO
PD319.pdf.
221. Commission Regulation 513/2011, 2011 O.J. (L 145) (EU), amending Commission Regulation
1060/2009, 2009 O.J. (L 302) (EC).
222. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 931-939H,
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things, Dodd-Frank imposes conflict-of-interest restrictions on CRA boards, prescribes
the establishment of internal control structures, 223 attempts to separate sales and
marketing from ratings, and imposes new duties on CRA compliance officers.224 DoddFrank directed the SEC to create a new Office of Credit Ratings. 225 In addition, DoddFrank sought to drastically reduce the importance of credit ratings in the financial system
by requiring the removal of certain statutory references to credit ratings. 22 6 New liability
provisions for CRAs also were set forth. 227
In February 2011, IOSCO issued its final report on CRAs. 228 This report declared a
victory for IOSCO's 2003 principles for CRAs by claiming that "although the structure
and specific provisions of CRA regulatory programs may differ, the objectives of the four
IOSCO CRA Principles are embedded into each of the programs." 229 In this report,
IOSCO compared the implementation of CRA regulation in seven jurisdictionsAustralia, Brazil, European Union, Japan, Mexico, Switzerland, and the United States. 230
Despite some of the differences among these countries' regulatory programs and their
different stages of implementation, IOSCO felt that all of them had implemented IOSCO
principles. 23 1 The report pointed out differences in each jurisdiction's definition of
"credit rating agency," registration requirements, and enforcement authority. 232 For
example, while the European Union, United States, and Japan have definitions for "credit
rating" and "credit rating agency" that build on each other, Australia defines only "credit
rating" while Mexico defines only "credit rating agency." 233 Australia's program
compels registration of all CRAs operating in the country, the European Union requires
CRAs to register with their home member states, and the United States requires a CRA to
be registered as an NRSRO if the agency's ratings are to be used for regulatory
purposes. 234
This effort probably demonstrates that the level of generality of the IOSCO
principles is such that implementation discrepancies can be explained away. Yet, it raises
a question as to how influential IOSCO is in harmonizing regulations to avoid

124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
223. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 15E(c)(3)(A), 48 Stat. 881 (1934).
224. Id. § 15E(j)(2)(B).
225. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(p), as amended by Dodd-Frank § 932.
226. Dodd-Frank § 939.
227. Section 939G repealed the exemption of rating agencies from liability under section 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933 so that NRSRS could be sued as "experts" for statements made in prospectuses and
registration statements. But in the first offering to occur after Dodd-Frank was passed, the SEC waived this
requirement because the rating agencies refused to consent to be named as experts, and so a $1 billion Ford
Motor Credit Company debt offering could not go forward. Ford Motor Credit Company LLC, SEC No-Action
Letter (Nov. 23, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/2010/ford0722101120.htm.
228. IOSCO, REGULATORY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES REGARDING THE
ACTIVITIES OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES (Feb. 2011) [hereinafter REGULATORY IMPLEMENTATION], available
at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD346.pdf.
229. Id. at 3.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 38.
232. Id. at 13-17.
233. REGULATORY IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 228, at 13-14.
234. Id. at 14-15.
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competitive races to the bottom among different jurisdictions. Ironically, the three major
CRAs are all U.S. companies, 235 so differential regulations of CRAs is unlikely to
prevent them from moving from the United States to other locations, unless the United
States were to impose more stringent regulations than other jurisdictions. Rather, what
could happen is that other jurisdictions, in particular the European Union, could attempt
to break up this oligopoly or set up rival CRAs.
In May 2011, the European Union published a regulation on CRAs, amending its
23 6
prior regulation that had assigned ESMA the task of registering and regulating CRAs.
Although this regulation is similar to Dodd-Frank, in certain ways it goes further in
attempting to reform the credit ratings process. Independence requirements for the CRA's
boards are specified and the board members must have expertise as well as
independence. 237 Their terms are limited to five years. They must identify and eliminate
conflicts of interest. 238 Internal control mechanisms must be established. Consultancy or
advisory services cannot be provided to issuers undergoing a rating. 239 The possibility
that the European Union will take stronger action against the CRAs than the United
States is related to the ire the EU Commission and European governments have at the
CRAs for their role in the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. CRAs have been castigated for
failing to exercise stricter standards with regard to structured finance products and for
downgrading, or threatening to downgrade, sovereign debt. EU politicians have even
floated the idea of creating a European foundation or agency to counter the dominance of
the big three rating agencies. 240 It is more likely that the EU will act to reduce investor
reliance on credit ratings, which will mirror provisions of Dodd-Frank requiring U.S.
regulators to eliminate references to ratings in their regulations. 24 1
In Hong Kong, CRAs are now subject to a new regulatory regime, which became
235. Moody's is an independent public company listed on the NYSE. Standard & Poor's is a subsidiary of
McGraw Hill. Fitch is partly owned by a French parent, but its origin is a U.S. firm. These three firms account
for 80% of all ratings. See Kathleen L. Casey, Comm'r, SEC, Remarks at the Commission Open Meeting (Dec.
3, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speechl2008/spchl20308klc.htm#P23_2884; cf, Aline van
Duyn & Richard Milne, Arbiters Under Fire, FIN. TIMES, July 25, 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/
a246b0c2-b629-1 Ie0-8bed-00 144feabdcO.html#axzzl r7MzuOEg.
236. Commission Regulation 513/2011, 2011 O.J. (L 145) (EU), amending Commission Regulation
1060/2009, 2009 O.J. (L 302) (EC).
237. Id.
237. Id.
239. Commission Regulation 513/2011, Annex III, 2011 O.J. (L 145) (EU), amending Commission
Regulation 1060/2009, 2009 O.J. (L 302) (EC). The SEC has proposed rules on the supervision, transparency,
and integrity of credit ratings. Under the proposed rules, each NRSRO must file an annual report with the SEC
on its internal controls; prohibit employees who participate in the NRSRO's sales or marketing from also
participating in determining credit ratings: conduct a "look back" review on former employees; publicly
disclose additional information on the historical performance of its credit ratings on a uniforn basis; and
establish standards of training, experience, and competence for credit analysts. Proposed Rules for Nationally
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 64,514 (May 18, 2011), 76 Fed. Reg.
33,423-76 (June 18, 2011).
240. See Downgrade the Rating Agencies, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/
b9aaf7b0-4291-1 lel-93ea-00144feab49a.html#axzzltNis9vSA.
241. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §939, 124 Stat.
1885 (2010). Unfortunately, this requirement conflicts with Basel Committee mandates. See Jacqui Street, US
Regs: Basel III Conflicts with Dodd-Frank,GFSNEWS, July 27, 2011, http://www.gfsnews.com/article/2540/l/
USr regsBael III-conflicts-with-Dodd-Frank (identifying conflicts between Basel III and Dodd-Frank).
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effective on June 1, 2011.242 CRAs and analysts who provide rating services in Hong
Kong are now required to file registration materials with the SFC. 243 The revised code is
based on IOSCO's Code of Conduct Fundamentals for CRAs, and the SFC believes that
the new standard in Hong Kong will be consistent with the enhanced standards that have
been adopted in a number of other jurisdictions. 244 Also in an attempt to conform to
international standards and practices, Singapore MAS put forward, in March 2011, a
proposal on the regulation of CRAs. 24 5 The proposed regulatory regime would add
"providing credit rating services" to the list of regulated activity under the Securities and
Futures Act, thus requiring CRAs to be licensed. 24 6 Similar to the regime in Hong Kong,
the proposed Singaporean regime also includes a Code of Conduct for CRAs based
largely on IOSCO's Code of Conduct.
IOSCO has played the role of both a leader and a follower with regard to the
improved regulation of CRAs. Since the two biggest CRAs are U.S. companies, and the
third is a U.S. subsidiary of a French company, the regulation of CRAs is necessarily a
primary concern of the SEC. 247 Yet the activities of CRAs are worldwide, and Europeans
have been at least as unhappy with CRA responsibility for the 2008 financial crisis as
U.S. politicians. Although IOSCO has taken its cue from the SEC to some extent in its
efforts to advocate better regulation of CRAs, it has sometimes gotten in front of the SEC
in promoting new regulatory initiatives. At other times it has followed the SEC and other
jurisdictions in articulating new standards.
C. Short Sale Regulation
Regulation of short sales is another politicized topic. "A short sale .

.

. is a sale of

any security the seller does not own or any sale consummated by the delivery of a
borrowed security." 24 8 A former SEC rule prohibited any person from affecting a short
sale of any exchange listed security below the price at which the last sale of that security
242. Press Release, Sec. & Futures Comm'n, SFC Achieves Smooth Transition for Credit Rating Agencies
Falling Within New Regulatory Regime (June 2, 2011), available at http://www.sfc.hk/sfcPressRelease/EN/
sfcOpenDocServlet?docno=
PR63.
243. Id.
244. SEC. & FUTURES COMM'N, CONSULTATION CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING THE REGULATORY
OVERSIGHT OF CREDIT RATING AGENCIES (2010), available at http://www.sfc.hk/sfc/doc/EN/speeches/public/
consult/conclusions cra eng.pdf.
245. Press Release, Monetary Auth. of Singapore, MAS Consults on Proposal to Regulate Credit Rating
Agencies (Mar. 23, 2011).
246. Id.
247. See generally SEC, SUMMARY REPORT OF COMMISSION STAFF'S EXAMINATIONS OF EACH
NATIONALLY

RECOGNIZED

STATISTICAL

RATING

ORGANIZATION

(Sept.

2011),

available

at

http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/2011_nrsrosectionl5e_examinationssummaryreport.pdf.
248. Rule 3b-3 promulgated under the 1934 Act defines the term "short sale" to mean any sale of a security
which the seller does not own or any sale which is consummated by the delivery of a security borrowed by, or
for the account of, the seller. A person shall be deemed to own a security if (1) he or his agent has title to it; or
(2) he has purchased, or has entered into an unconditional contract, binding on both parties thereto, to purchase
it but has not yet received it; or (3) he owns a security convertible into or exchangeable for it and has tendered
such security for conversion or exchange; or (4) he has an option to purchase or acquire it and has exercised
such option; and (5) he has rights or warrants to subscribe to it and has exercised such rights or warrants:
Provided, however, that a person shall be deemed to own securities only to the extent that he has a net long
position in such securities. 17 C.F.R. § 242.200 (2010).
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was reported." 24 9 "This was known as the 'uptick' rule." 250 The SEC rescinded it in the
summer of 2007 because it believed the rule had become unnecessary with decimal
pricing and the transparency and surveillance in exchange markets. 25 1 Further, the
widespread availability of options and derivatives had made the rule of questionable
utility because it could be so easily evaded by trades in the futures markets. Nevertheless,
after the financial crisis was triggered by the collapse of Bear Steams, and Lehman
Brothers began to fail, there was a hue and cry about short sellers, and the SEC responded
by prohibiting short sales in financial stocks. 252
Between July 21 and July 29 of 2007, the SEC restricted short sales in 19 financial
stocks. 253 After this emergency order expired, turmoil in the stock market continued, and
financial firms claimed that their stocks were being pounded by short sellers. In
September 2008, the SEC banned short selling in the stocks of 799 U.S. financial sector
companies and later allowed the exchanges to add additional companies to the list. 254
Nearly 1000 stocks went on to this list, including CVS Caremark Corp., International
Business Machines Corp., General Motors Corp., and General Electric Corp. 2 55 The SEC
also required hedge fund managers to disclose their short positions publicly, and it
announced that this requirement would be made permanent. 256
The SEC then banned "abusive naked short selling," or short selling by persons who
do not actually borrow stock to deliver against a sale and fail to deliver stock to the
buyer. 257 By a temporary rule, on September 17, 2008, the SEC required short sellers and
their broker-dealers to deliver securities by the close of business on settlement date and
imposed penalties for failure to do so. 258 The SEC made this ban permanent in July
2009.259

249. Roberta Karmel, Address at the University of Washington School of Law: Harry Cross Visiting
Professor Lecture (Jan. 29, 2009), available at http://www.law.washington.edu/Multimedia/2009/karmell
Transcript.aspx?&Iang-enus&output-json. Former rule l0a-1 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was
adopted in 1938 to prevent bear raids. Exchange Act Release No. 1,548 (Jan. 24, 1938), 3 Fed. Reg. 213 (Jan.
26, 1938).
250. Karmel, supra note 249; see generally GERALD T. LINS ET AL., HEDGE FUNDS AND OTHER PRIVATE
FUNDS: REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE § 6:21 (Nov. 2011).
.251. Regulation SHO and Rule 1Oa-1, Exchange Act Release No. 55,970 (June 28, 2007), 72 Fed. Reg.
36,348 (July 3, 2007).
252. See generally infra notes 253-56.
253. Emergency Order, Exchange Act Release No. 58,166, 93 SEC Docket 2122 (July 15, 2008); see Mark
Hulbert, Maybe Short-Selling Isn't So Bad, After All, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/09/28/your-money/28iht-28stra.16527650.html (noting the ban of short sales on a large number of stocks).
254. Emergency Order, Exchange Act Release No. 58,592, 94 SEC Docket 460 (Sept. 18, 2008);
Amendment to Emergency Order, Exchange Act Release No. 58,611, 94 SEC Docket 501 (Sept. 21, 2008).
255. Kara Scannell & Serena Ng, SEC's Ban on Short Selling Is Castinga Very Wide Net, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 26, 2008, at Cl, available at http://www.marketwatch.com/story/sec-ban-casts-wide-net-2008-09-25.
256. Emergency Order, Exchange Act Release No. 58,591, 94 SEC Docket 312 (Sept. 18, 2008).
257. The SEC adopted Regulation SHO to replace Rules 3b-3, l0a-1 and lOa-2, seeking to solve the
problem of naked short selling. This regulation required short sellers in equity securities to locate securities to
borrow before selling and imposed strict delivery requirements. Text of Proposed Regulation SHO,
Amendments and Temporary Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 48,709, 2003 WL 22461522 (Oct. 28, 2003).
258. 7 C.F.R. § 242.204T (2008); Emergency Order, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 58,572, 94 SEC
Docket 293 (Sept. 17, 2008).
259. Amendments to Regulation SHO, Exchange Act Release No. 60,388, 74 Fed. Reg. 38,266 (July 31,
2009).
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Other jurisdictions quickly copied the SEC's bans on short selling. 260 The United
Kingdom banned short positions in 34 financial stocks until January 2009, and it required
daily disclosure of all net short positions. 26 1 Other European countries also put in
bans. 262 Hong Kong enforced its uptick rule that allowed shorting of shares that had risen
in value, and Singapore tightened its rules to discourage naked short selling. 263 Australia
banned naked short selling and required disclosure of other short selling. 264
The SEC's short selling bans were criticized as making a volatile market worse-a
"clumsy effort to buoy shares of battered financial stocks." 265 It appears that the SEC's
short sale bans cut the volume in the stocks on the no-short-sale list, resulting in wide
price swings. 266 Further, despite the bans, stocks including National City Corp. and
Sovereign Bancorp Inc. declined sharply, and Washington Mutual Inc. and Wachovia
Corp. failed.26 7 SEC Chair Christopher Cox later concluded that the SEC's emergency
short sale rules were a mistake. 268
The political pressure around the world to ban or at least mitigate short selling was
responded to in a fairly measured way by IOSCO in a paper authored by IOSCO's
Technical Committee and issued in June 2009.269 This paper asserted that short selling
plays an important and beneficial role in the market, but it can also contribute to
disorderly markets. 270 The Committee does not define "short selling" but believes that it
is "more pragmatic to [look at] whether a particular transaction is a short selling activity
by looking at the nature of the transaction." 27 1 If a transaction is a sale of stock that the
seller does not own at the point of sale, then the Committee will deem such a transaction
a short selling activity. 272 In recognizing that the regulation of short selling varies
substantially among its members, the Committee urges a more common approach and
recommends that market authorities develop short selling regimes based on the principles
described below. 273
IOSCO formulated four principles for regulating short selling. The first principle

260. James Mackintosh, Short Shrift, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2008, at 10.
261. Id.; FIN. SERVS. AUTH., SHORT SELLING (No. 2) INSTRUMENT 2008 (2008), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/Short-sellingFAQs V5.pdf.
262. See EUROPEAN SEC. & MKTS. AUTH., UPDATE ON MEASURES ADOPTED BY COMPETENT
AUTHORITIES ON SHORT SELLING (Feb. 16, 2012), available at http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/201139.pdf.
263. Mackintosh, supranote 260.
264. Naked Short Selling Not Permitted and Covered Short Selling to Be Disclosed, Aus. SEC. & INV.
COMM'N (Sept. 19, 2008), http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic.nsf/byheadline/08-204+Naked+short+selling+not
+permitted+and+covered+short+selling+to+be+disclosed?openDocument.
265. Tom Lauricella et al., SEC Extends 'Short' Ban As Bailout Advances, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2008, at
Cl.
266. Id.
267. Id
268. Rachelle Younglai, SEC Chief Has Regrets over Short-Selling Ban, REUTERS, Dec. 31, 2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/12/3 1/us-sec-cox-idUSTRE4BU3GG20081231.
269.

TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE IOSCO, REGULATION OF SHORT SELLING (June 2009) [hereinafter

REGULATION OF SHORT SELLING], availableat http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdflIOSCOPD292.pdf
270. Id at 4.
271. Idat8.
272. Id at 23.
273. Id at 6.
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states that "short selling should be subject to appropriate controls to reduce or minimize
the potential risks that could affect the orderly and efficient functioning and stability of
financial markets." 274 Some jurisdictions already employ a variety of measures and
controls designed to counter the risks of short selling. 27 5 However, the Committee
recognizes that not all of these measures are appropriately applicable across borders. 276
To discourage and deter abusive short selling behavior, the Committee instead
recommends that regulations impose a strict settlement of failed trades-in other words,
outlaw naked short selling. 2 77
IOSCO's second principle with regard to short selling is that such "selling should be
subject to a reporting regime that provides timely information to the market or to market
authorities." 2 78 While the Committee believes that "regulators should aim to promote
appropriate transparency of short selling information to the market," it also recognizes
that "information on short selling may mislead the market and [that] increasing
transparency might expose short sellers and subject them to [a] potential short
squeeze." 279 The Committee thus urges regulators to carefully address the objective of
the transparency regime for short sales. 280
As might be expected, IOSCO'S third principle relates to enforcement. It is that
short selling should be subject to an effective compliance and enforcement system.28 1 In
order to instill settlement discipline and minimize the potential for settlement disruption
risk, the Committee believes that there must be strict settlement of failed trades. 2 82 To do
so, the Committee encourages authorities to consider whether they can extend the power
to require information from not only persons and entities that are domestically licensed,

274. REGULATION OF SHORT SELLING, supra note 269, at 4.
275. Id. at 5.
276. Id. at 7-8.
277. Some jurisdictions achieve this by compulsory buy-in or closeout, while some impose monetary
penalties on market participants. A short settlement cycle can also help reinforce settlement discipline-IOSCO
and CPSS recommend a T+3 settlement cycle-and the Committee strongly encourages market authorities to
consider implementing these recommendations of strict settlement requirements while taking into account
domestic conditions. In addition to strict settlement requirements, other tools that authorities should consider
include eligibility criteria for stocks that can be short sold; pre-borrowing or "locate" requirements; price
restriction rules; or the "flagging" of short sales. Id. at 9-10.
278. Id. at 6.
279.

REGULATION OF SHORT SELLING, supranote 269, at 11.

280.

Id. at 11-12. Specifically, the Committee recommends regulators to consider these objectives:

[p]rovide ready access to information on short selling to improve insight into market dynamics;
[d]eter market abuse; [m]itigate the potential disorderly market effects of aggressive short selling;
[p]rovide early warning signs of build-up of large short positions and alerts to prompt investigation
and ... [p]rovide evidentiary proof that aids in post-event investigation and disciplinary action.
Id. at 12. In addition, the Committee discusses and makes recommendations with regard to what should be
reported, the frequency and trigger level of reporting, the constituents responsible for reporting, and the
recipients of these reports. Id. at 12. Finally, with regard to the reporting models-flagging of short sales versus
short position reporting-the Committee believes that it may be easier for national market authorities to monitor
compliance with the first method because brokers can be held accountable for any failure to report short sales.
Id.at 12-15.
281.

REGULATION OF SHORT SELLING, supra note 269, at 16.

282. Id.
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2 83
but also parties suspected of breach that may not be licensed or registered.
Furthermore, the Committee encourages cross-border enforcement cooperation using
several tools and frameworks that IOSCO has already created and put in place. 284
As discussed above, the Committee believes that short selling has certain benefits
and facilitates market development. 28 5 Accordingly, IOSCO's fourth principle is that
"[s]hort selling regulation should allow appropriate exceptions for certain types of
transactions for efficient market functioning and development." 2 86 The Committee thus
envisions a regulatory regime where more flexibility is given to "short selling activities
that are critical to the efficient functioning of capital markets and the orderly
development of the market for better risk management"-activities such as bona fide
hedging, market making, and arbitrage. 2 87 Although these activities may be exempt from
restrictions, the Committee does not believe they should be exempt from reporting
requirements and urges authorities to clearly define what falls under exempted
activities. 288
Although enormous political pressure was brought to bear on the SEC to reinstate
the uptick rule, 289 the SEC instead adopted a circuit breaker rule that would apply only
during a severe price decline in a particular security. 290 The SEC's short sale rule goes
into effect on a day when the price of an individual security declines intra-day by 10% or
more from the prior day's closing price of that security as determined by the security's
listing market. 29 1 In such an event, the rule imposes an uptick rule for the remainder of
the day and the following day prohibiting short sellers from selling at or below the
current national best bid while the circuit breaker is in effect. 292 The SEC rejected its
own proposal that the uptick rule could be based on the last sale price on the ground that
the national best bid is more suitable to today's markets.
Under the rule, broker-dealers must mark all sell orders of an equity security as
"long," "short," or "short exempt." 29 3 Once the circuit breaker has been triggered, a
broker-dealer may execute certain "short exempt" sales, but in order to do so, the order
must be so marked and the short sale must, at the time of its submission to a trading
center, be priced above the national best bid. 294 Further, broker-dealers must establish,
maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures that are reasonably designed to

283.
the short
16-17.
284.
285.
286.

Authorities should also use the surveillance data collected from either the flagging of short sales or
positions reporting methods to analyze and identify potential market abuses and systemic risk. Id. at
Id at 17.
Id at 18.
REGULATION OF SHORT SELLING, supra note 269, at 4.

287. Id. at 18.
288. Id at 18-19.
289. Mary Schapiro, President Obama's appointee for Chairman of the SEC, represented in her Senate
confirmation hearing that she would quickly examine whether the uptick rule should be restored. Stephen
Labaton, S.E.C. Nominee Offers Planfor Tighter Regulation, N.Y. TMES, Jan. 16, 2009, at B3.
290. 17 C.F.R. § 242.201 (2010); see SEC Final Rule-Amendments to Regulation SHO, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-61595 (Feb. 26, 2010).
291. Amendments to Regulation SHO, 17 C.F.R. pt. 242 (2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
final/2010/34-61595fr.pdf.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
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prevent the incorrect identification of "short exempt" orders. 295 There are certain other
limited exceptions to the rule, which include an owner whose delivery is delayed, odd lot
transactions, and domestic and international arbitrage transactions. But there is no
exception for market making activity. 29 6 Market centers are required to institute policies
and procedures to ensure that orders are not displayed or executed contrary to the rule. 297
These new procedures need to include mechanisms to avoid the display of impermissibly
priced sale orders and the display and execution of "short exempt" orders. 2 98 But if an
order is improperly priced, the trading center can re-price it upwards or hold it.
The short sale rule applies only to "covered securities," which generally are
securities trading on a national securities exchange. 29 9 The rule will not apply to nonnational market system securities, options, or derivatives. The SEC recognized that
parties can obtain a short position through the use of derivative products and such
synthetic short positions may undermine the goals for adopting the new short sale rule.
But the SEC's former short sale rule did not apply to derivative products, and the SEC
lacks the authority to extend the short sale rule to such products if they are financial
futures. 300
The general policies behind the rule are to allow long sellers to sell first in a
declining market, to facilitate and maintain stability in the markets and help ensure that
they function efficiently, and to help restore investor confidence in times of substantial
uncertainty. The narrow reach of the rule demonstrates the SEC's own skepticism as to
the merits of a new short sale rule in the face of the SEC's recognition that short selling
benefits market liquidity and pricing efficiency. The SEC had already banned naked short
selling. 30 1
The SEC's actions were consistent with IOSCO's principles and short sale
regulations in other jurisdictions. By 2010, many regulators had decided to regulate short
selling through disclosure. On March 2, 2010, CESR 302 issued a recommendation to the
European Commission to implement a pan-European short selling disclosure regime. 3 03
As proposed, "[t]he regime will require investors to reveal big short-selling positions to
regulators and empower an EU watchdog to ask for sensitive information and temporarily
stop short-selling. 304 "EU countries will, however, be allowed veto such a ban." 30 5 If
both parliament and EU member countries reach agreement, the law could be in place by
the end of this year. Hong Kong has also announced that it will implement a short

295. Id.
296. 17 C.F.R. pt. 242.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Kathleen L. Casey, Comm'r, SEC, Statement at Open Meeting Short-Sale Restrictions (2010),
availableat http://www.sec.gov/news/speechl2010/spchO22410klc-shortsales.htm.
302. CESR was the Committee of European Securities Regulators, now replaced by ESMA.
303. CESR Recommends Pan-European Short-Selling Disclosure Regime, HEDGEWEEK (Mar. 2, 2010
6:26
PM),
http://www.hedgeweek.com/2010/03/02/37162/cesr-recommends-pan-european-short-sellingdisclousre-regime.
304. John O'Donnell, EU Countries Back Plans to Tackle Short-Selling, REUTERS, May 17, 2011,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/17/us-eu-shortselling-idUSTRE74G6XW20110517.
305. Id.
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position reporting regime. 306 Under the new regulations "[m]arket participants will have
to disclose any short position that is equal to or greater than 0.02 per cent of the issued
share capital of a listed company, or a market value of HK $30M ($3.8M [USD]),
whichever is lower." 307
Railing against short sellers seems to be shooting the messenger rather than listening
to the message, but many observers believe that abusive short selling drove down the
prices of financial stocks in 2008. But the problem of leverage in the bull market that
preceded the 2008 market collapse was a more serious cause of the financial meltdown
than eliminating the uptick rule. Further, there is no way to reinstate a meaningful uptick
rule without limiting derivatives on stocks. The AIG credit default swaps debacle 308
demonstrates that a short sale rule for bonds may also be justified if a new short sale rule
for stocks is promulgated.
Although IOSCO generally has responded to the financial crisis by recommending
principles or standards that increase regulation, in the case of short selling, IOSCO's
response was to limit political pressures for either absolute bans on short selling or an
uptick rule. 309 Instead, IOSCO opted to recommend disclosure and restrictions on failed
trades, which in effect bans naked short selling. 310
Considering how ineffective the short sale bans were in 2008, regulators in Europe
surprisingly re-imposed short sale bans on bank stocks in the summer of 2011, in the
midst of the sovereign debt crisis. 3 11 ESMA implemented the ban in Belgium, France,
Italy, and Spain, and some have argued that "short-selling prohibitions [were] better
coordinated and more tailored than those imposed after the 2008 collapse of Lehman
Brothers." 312 Others sharply criticized the measures as an ineffective waste of resources
and a drain on market efficiency. 3 13 It is worth noting that Germany and the United
3 14
Kingdom declined to participate in the short selling ban.
As the sovereign debt crisis continues to rage in Europe, the EU has taken steps to
make the increased regulation of short selling a permanent fixture in the region's
financial markets. At the member-state level, France has extended its ban on short sales
in the shares of ten French financial firms, including behemoths Soci6t6 Gdndrale and
BNP Paribas. 3 15 At the EU level, on November 15, 2011, the European Parliament
approved the final text of the Regulation on Short Selling and Certain Aspects of Credit

306. Robert Cookson, HK Unveils New Regime on Short Selling, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2010,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1517dbae-2624-1ldf-afl3-00144feabdcO.html#axzzlWWr4Q91Z.
307. Id.
308. See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY, supra note 172, at 50-51, 344-45 (describing the credit default crisis
swaps).
309. See generally REGULATION OF SHORT SELLING, supra note 269 (noting the IOSCO's response in the
face of widespread political pressure).
310. Id.
311. Brooke Masters, European Short-Selling Ban Comes Under Attack, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2011,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/763al85e-c4eI-lleO-9c4d-00144feabdcO.html#axzzlWWr4Q91Z.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Press Release, Autorite des Marches Financiers, Extension of the Ban on the Taking of Net Short
Positions in Ten French Securities of Financial Sector (Nov. 10, 2011), available at http://www.amffrance.org/documents/general/10201_l.pdf.
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Default Swaps (the Regulation). 3 16 The Regulation, subject to formal approval by the EU
Council, will come into effect on November 1, 2012.317 It will introduce restrictions and
disclosure requirements on short selling EU shares and sovereign bonds, and it will also
prohibit naked or uncovered credit default swaps relating to EU sovereign debt.3 18
ESMA will enforce these new restrictions and disclosure requirements. 3 19
For the shares of EU corporations, the Regulation requires natural or legal persons to
privately notify financial regulators if they accumulate "net short positions" above 0.2%
of the issued share capital of an issuer and further notifications at each further 0.1%
increment. 320 If such position crosses 0.5%, the investor must publicly disclose its
existence and make further public disclosures for each additional 0.1% increment. 32 1
These disclosures must also include the identity of the person holding the net short
position. 322 The Regulation has similar disclosure requirements regarding short positions
in the sovereign debt of EU countries; however, the required disclosure is only made to
financial regulators and will never become public. 323 The Regulation does not provide
criteria for when the disclosure requirement is triggered with regards to sovereign debt as
"ESMA shall publish on its website the notification thresholds for each Member
State." 324
The remaining portion of the Regulation institutes a ban on naked short sales
involving the shares of EU corporations and EU sovereign debt. The Regulation prohibits
a natural or legal person from entering a short sale unless one or more of the following
conditions are satisfied:
(a) the natural or legal person has borrowed the share; or has made alternative
provisions resulting in a similar legal effect;
(b) the natural or legal person has entered into an agreement to borrow the
share or has another absolutely enforceable claim under contract or property
law to be transferred ownership of a corresponding number of securities of the
same class so that settlement can be effected when it is due;
(c) the natural or legal person has an arrangement with a third party under
which that third party has confirmed that the share has been located and has
taken measures vis-4-vis third parties necessary for the natural or legal person

316. Commission Regulation 263/2012, Short Selling and Certain Aspects of Credit Default Swaps
Regulation, 2012 O.J. (L 86) (EU), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
OJ:L:2012:086:000l:0024:en:PDF.
317. Id. at24.
318. Parliament Seals Ban on Sovereign Debt Speculation and Short Selling Limitations, EUR.
15,
2011,
12:26 PM),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/en/pressroom/content/
PARLIAMENT
(Nov.
20111115IPR31525/html/Parliament-seals-ban-on-sovereign-debt-speculation-and-short-selling-limitations.
319. Id.
320. Commission Regulation 263/2012, Short Selling and Certain Aspects of Credit Default Swaps
Regulation, art. 5, 2012 O.J. (L 86) (EU), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
OJ:L:2012:086:0001:0024:en:PDF.
321. Id.
atart. 7.
322. Id.
323. EuR. PARLIAMENT, supra note 318.
324. Id.
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to have reasonable expectation that settlement can be effected when it is due. 325
The ban on naked short sales involving EU sovereign debt is identical to the one
covering corporate shares except for two important distinctions. First, there has been a
textual change to subsection (c), which reads as follows: "the natural or legal person has
an arrangement with a third party under which that third party has confirmed that the
sovereign debt has been located or has otherwise reasonable expectation that settlement
can be effected when it is due." 326 The switch from "and" to "or" in subsection (c)
provides market participants more freedom to short EU sovereign debt than EU corporate
shares. The second difference is a provision allowing suspension of the ban if "liquidity
of sovereign debt falls below the threshold determined in accordance with [the
Regulation]." 327 These two important differences are likely a response to the fear that a
more aggressive short sale ban could erode liquidity in the EU sovereign debt markets if
investors felt they were unable to adequately hedge their positions.
The EU, recognizing that "[b]uying credit default swaps without having a long
position in underlying sovereign debt .. . can be, economically speaking, equivalent to
taking a short position on the underlying debt instrument," has also included a ban on
uncovered credit default swaps referencing EU sovereign debt. 32 8 Under the Regulation,
a credit default swap is considered "uncovered" unless it serves as a hedge against:
(a) the risk of default of the issuer where the natural or legal person has a long
position in the sovereign debt of that issuer to which the sovereign credit
default swap relates, or
(b) the risk of a decline of the value of the sovereign debt where the natural or
legal person holds assets or is subject to liabilities, including but not limited to
financial contracts, a portfolio of assets or financial obligations the value of
which is correlated to the value of the sovereign debt. 329
As with the naked short sale ban on sovereign debt, the ban on uncovered credit
default swaps can be temporarily suspended if a country's financial authority believes 330

325. Commission Regulation 263/2012, Short Selling and Certain Aspects of Credit Default Swaps
Regulation, art. 12a.1, 2012 O.J. (L 86) (EU), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eulLexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?
uri=OJ:L:2012:086:0001:0024:en:PDF.
326. Id. at art. 12a. .c (emphasis added).
327. Id. at art. 12a.1b.
328. Id. at art. 13.
329. Id. at art. 4.
330. The Regulation lays out the following criteria for a country's financial regulator to consider when
making this determination:
(a) high or rising interest rate on the sovereign debt;
(b) widening of interest rate spreads on the sovereign debt compared to the sovereign debt of other
sovereign issuers;
(c) widening of the sovereign credit default swap spreads compared to the own curve and compared
to other sovereign issuers;
(d) timeliness of the return of the price of the sovereign debt to its original equilibrium after a large
trade;
(e) amounts of sovereign debt that can be traded.
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its "sovereign debt market is not functioning properly and that such restrictions might
have a negative impact on the sovereign credit default swap market, especially by
increasing the cost of borrowing for sovereign issuers or affecting the sovereign issuers'
ability to issue new debt." 3 31 Once again, the insertion of this provision shows the
tension between limiting short selling and ensuring market liquidity.
The discrepancies between IOSCO's recommendations, the U.S. regulation of short
selling, and the bans on short selling in Europe demonstrate a failure of international
regulation. Where national regulators perceive a strong national interest in a regulatory
reaction to a problem in the capital markets, they go their own ways. The global
marketplace is then left to cope with inconsistent regulation however it can, either by
moving trades to less regulated jurisdictions, or inventing synthetic securities to mimic
outlawed transactions. While IOSCO can recommend approaches to problems, it does not
have the clout to impose those approaches on jurisdictions that choose to approach the
problems differently.
D. The Flash-Crash,High Frequency Trading,and Dark Pools
As regulators scrambled to address the issues surrounding hedge funds, credit rating
agencies, and short selling in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, they were confronted
with yet another set of issues stemming from the market events of May 6, 2010,
commonly referred to as the "Flash-Crash." On that day, when U.S. stocks were already
3 32
Shares in Proctor
down five percent, around 2:40 p.m. the market began to plummet.
& Gamble fell 37%; shares of Accenture slid from $40 a share to trade at one cent. 333 At
one point, the Dow Jones average was down 998.50 points-its biggest intraday point
drop ever. 334 Eventually the market bounced back to close down 347.80 points, or 3.2%,
at 10,520.32.335 Despite this late recovery, the extreme volatility exhibited during the
Flash-Crash compelled regulators to investigate what had caused the extreme price
movements.
3 36
the
According to the joint SEC-CFTC Report on the Flash-Crash (the Report),
high
of
the
midst
in
when,
p.m.
at
2:32
began
crash
to
the
leading
that
day
events
chain of
volatility and thinning market liquidity, "a mutual fund firm used an algorithm to sell a
total of 75,000 E-Mini contracts 337 (worth approximately $4.1 billion) to hedge an
Commission Regulation 263/2012, Short Selling and Certain Aspects of Credit Default Swaps Regulation, art
12b.2, 2012 O.J. (L 86) (EU), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
OJ:L:2012:086:0001:0024:en:PDF.
331. Id.
332. Tom Lauricella & Peter A. McKay, Dow Takes a Harrowing 1,010.14-Point Trip, WALL ST. J., May
7, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704370704575227754131412596.html.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Aline van Duyn et al., That Sinking Feeling, FIN. TIMES, June 2, 2010, at 9.
336. SEC & CFTC STAFFS, FINDINGS REGARDING THE MARKET EvENTs OF MAY 6, 2010 (Sept. 30, 2010)
[hereinafter MARKET EVENTS REPORT], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/marketeventsreport.pdf. This report builds upon the initial analyses of May 6 performed by the staffs of the Commissions and
released May 18, 2010. SEC & CFTC STAFFS, PRELIMINARY FINDINGS REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF
MAY 6, 2010 (May 18, 2010) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY REPORT], available at http://www.sec.gov/sec-cftcprelimreport.pdf.
337. An E-mini is "[a]n electronically traded futures contract on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange that
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existing equity position." 3 38 To execute the trade, the fund employed a sell algorithm that
targeted trading volume, without any consideration for price or timing, selling the entire
block extremely rapidly in just 20 minutes. 339 This sell pressure was initially absorbed by
the market and most notably high frequency traders, which traded nearly "140,000 EMini contracts-or over 33% of the total trading volume." 340 Like a runaway train, the
sell algorithm responded to the increased volume coming from high frequency traders,
and other entities, by increasing the rate at which it fed the orders into the market, even
though orders that it already sent to the market were arguably not yet fully absorbed by
market participants. 34 1
While the Report finds that the mutual fund's massive sale of E-mini contracts via a
selling algorithm initially triggered the Flash-Crash, it falls short of singling out any
specific cause or set of causes for the extreme market movements observed that day.342
The Report does acknowledge the role of high frequency trading (HFT), noting that "the
automated execution of a large sell order can trigger extreme price movements, especially
if the automated execution algorithm does not take prices into account" and that "the
interaction between automated execution programs and algorithmic trading strategies can
quickly erode liquidity and result in disorderly markets." 34 3 The Report also notes that
the ensuing "sudden decline in both price and liquidity [are] symptomatic" of rapid price
movement, such that "fundamental buyers and cross-market arbitrageurs were either
unable or unwilling to supply enough buy-side liquidity." 344 Though not directly
mentioned in the Report, current SEC Chairperson Mary Schapiro also implicated dark
pools as one of the causes of the Flash-Crash, stating that "[t]he continuing growth of
trading in dark pools and other types of dark venues can challenge the quality of the
market's price-discovery function. And the complexity of the market structure sometimes
makes it difficult for even sophisticated investors to pursue their own best interests." 345
Regardless of the specific cause, the Flash-Crash illustrates the inter-connectedness of
the derivatives and securities markets, rendering the potential impact of HFT and dark
pools under those conditions very broad. 346 Accordingly, in the aftermath of the FlashCrash, IOSCO and other regulators around the world have set out to address these issues.
represents a portion of the normal futures contracts. E-mini contracts are available on a wide range of indexes
such as the Nasdaq 100, S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400 and Russell 2000." E-mini, INVESTOPEDIA.COM,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/emini.asp#axzzlXIGY8oDZ (last visited June 22, 2012).
338. MARKET EVENTS REPORT, supra note 336, at 2.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. Id. at 3.
342. Id. at 2. "The execution of this sell program resulted in the largest net change in daily position of any
trader in the E-Mini since the beginning of the year (from January 1, 2010 through May 6, 2010). Only two
single-day sell programs of equal or larger size-one of which was by the same large fundamental trader-were
executed in the E-Mini in the 12 months prior to May 6." MARKET EVENTS REPORT, supra note 336, at 2.
343. Id. at 6.
344. Id. at 4. "In the four-and-one-half minutes from 2:41 p.m. through 2:45:27 p.m., prices of the E-Mini
had fallen by more than 5% and prices of SPY suffered a decline of over 6%. At the same time, cross-market
trading firms were purchasing the E-Mini and selling either SPY, baskets of individual securities, or other index
products." Id.
345. Mary Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and
Investment (Mar. 10, 2011), available at http://sec.gov/news/testimony/2011/ts03101Imls.htm.
346.

MARKET EVENTS REPORT, supra note 336, at 6.
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The Flash-Crash was in some ways similar to the 1987 stock market crash but
occurred much more quickly. 347 One development that happened between 1987 and 2010
to cause this increased pace was advancement in trading technology. In the 1990s, with
the blessing of regulators around the world, the industry moved rapidly to computerize
exchanges. 348 Some brokerage firms created computerized trading systems by which
9
customers could enter orders through their own computers. 34 In 1993, the Integrated
Technology Plan was implemented on trading floor networks, computerizing every
aspect of trading floor operations. 350 In 1996, NYSE launched real-time stock tickers on
CNBC and CNN-FN. 35 1 The following year, the Wireless Data System allowed brokers
to receive orders, access market information, and transmit execution reports from any
location on the trading floor. 352 At the same time, the securities industry began trading in
increments of sixteenths in 1997 and then went to decimal trading in 2001.353 Of all these
developments, one of the most important is the rise of direct electronic access (DEA)
because without it neither HFT nor dark pools would be possible. DEA is defined by
IOSCO as a "process by which a person transmits orders on their own (i.e., without any
handling or re-entry by another person) directly into the market's trade matching system
for execution." 3 54 The NYSE first offered DEA in 2000 under a pilot program named
NYSE Direct+, which has since significantly expanded. 355 DEA is crucial to the FlashCrash story: first, because it provides HFT trading programs access to the securities
markets, and second, because it links the various exchanges where securities are traded.
IOSCO has correctly highlighted DEA as an issue, and published its first report on
the topic, Principlesfor Direct Electronic Access to Markets (Final Report), in August
2010.356 The Final Report was largely a continuation of a February 2009 Consultation
Report by the IOSCO Technical Committee that had identified three key elements for
consideration in relation to DEA: pre-conditions for DEA; information flow; and
adequate systems and controls. 3 57 Based on the guidance given by the consultation
347.
348.

Scott Patterson, How the "Flash Crash" Echoed Black Monday, WALL ST. J., May 18, 2010, at Cl.

U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, ELECTRONIC BULLS AND BEARS, U.S. SECURITIES
AND MARKETS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 130 (1990) [hereinafter ELECTRONIC BULLS AND BEARS];

Securities Exchange Act Release No. 27611, 55 Fed. Reg. 1890 (Jan. 12, 1990).
349. ELECTRONIC BULLS AND BEARS, supra note 348, at 140.
http://www.nyse.com/about/history/timeline
EURONEXT,
NYSE
Technology,
350. Timeline:
technology.html (last visited June 22, 2012).
351. Id.
352. NYSE "spent over $1 billion on technology between 1982 and 1995, allowing it to cut order
execution time dramatically" and "to handle daily order flows in excess of 1.4 billion shares." Jerry W.
Markham & David J. Harty, For Whom the Bell Tolls: The Demise ofExchange Trading Floors and the Growth
ofECNs, 33 J.CORP. L. 865, 920 (2008).
353. Deborah Lohse, U.S. Stock Exchanges Vote to Permit Trades of Big Board Stocks in Sixteenths,
WALL ST. J., May 13, 1997, at C18. The SEC's effort to introduce decimal trading was delayed until 2000. For
a discussion of the decimal trading requirement imposed by the SEC on the exchanges, see Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 42360 (Jan. 28, 2000), 65 Fed. Reg. 5003 (Feb. 2, 2000).
354. IOSCO, PRINCIPLES FOR DIRECT ELECTRONIC ACCESS TO MARKETS, Appendix I (August 2010)
[hereinafter DEA PRINCIPLES], available at www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdflioscopd332.pdf.
355. Timeline: Technology, supra note 350.
356. DEA PRINCIPLES, supra note 354, at 2.
357. Id. at 3.
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report, the Final Report sets forth principles for DEA, a key aspect of which is to provide
that neither markets nor intermediaries should offer DEA unless adequate pre-trade
information is provided, and that both regulatory and financial controls are in place to
allow intermediaries to implement appropriate risk limits. 35 8 The Committee concluded
that the need for markets and intermediaries to make available and utilize these
automated controls rests on the following basic proposition:
Whatever level of risk a firm accepts, it must never be infinite. Rather, the risks
undertaken must be limited to an appropriate level commensurate with the
capital and other financial resources of the firm and the prudent management of
both credit risk and any risk to fair and orderly trading. In an automated trading
environment, the only controls that can effectively enforce such limits are
automated controls. 3 59
IOSCO formulated eight principles for DEA arrangements, which it groups into
three key areas: pre-conditions for DEA; information flow; and adequate systems and
controls. 36 0 The first principle covers minimum customer standards and provides that
intermediaries should require DEA customers: (1) to have appropriate financial
resources; and (2) to have "appropriate procedures in place to assure that all relevant
persons are familiar with, and comply with, the rules of the market and have knowledge
and proficiency in the use of the order entry system used by the DEA customer." 36 1
Further, market authorities should have rules in place to require the adoption of these
standards. 362
The second principle is that "there should be a recorded, legally binding contract
between the intermediary and the DEA customer, the nature and detail of which should
be appropriate to -the nature of the service provided." 363 Further, "each market should
consider whether it is appropriate to have a legally binding contract or other relationship
between itself and the DEA customer." 364 The third principle is that the intermediary
should retain "ultimate responsibility for all orders under its authority, and for
365
In those
compliance of such orders with all regulatory requirements and market rules."
jurisdictions where a DEA customer is permitted to sub-delegate its direct access
privileges to another party (a sub-delegatee), the intermediary should continue to be
ultimately responsible for all orders entered under its authority by the sub-delegatee and
should require the sub-delegatee to meet minimum standards set for DEA customers in
general. "There should be a recorded, legally binding contract between the DEA
customers and the sub-delegatee, the nature and detail of which should be appropriate to
366
the nature of the service provided."
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.

Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 4.
Id at 17.
DEA PRINCIPLES, supra note 354, at 17.
Id at 18-19.
Id
Id at 18.
Id. at 19.

366.

IOSCO, REGULATORY ISSUES RAISED BY THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES ON MARKET

INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY (July 2011), available at http://markets.theasianbanker.com/assets/mediadl/
whitepaper/IOSCO.pdf.
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The third principle is related to the fourth principle that "intermediaries should
disclose to market authorities upon request and in a timely manner the identity of their
DEA customers in order to facilitate market surveillance. In those jurisdictions where
sub-delegation is permitted, the intermediary also [should assume] such responsibility to
the market authorities with respect to any sub-delegatees." 367 The fifth principle is that
"markets should provide member firms with access to relevant pre- and post-trade
information (on a real time basis) to enable these firms to implement appropriate
monitoring and risk management controls." 368 The sixth, seventh, and eighth principles
require a market to ensure the existence of systems and controls "reasonably designed to
enable the management of risk with regard to fair and orderly trading" as a condition for
DEA trading; require intermediaries to use controls to limit or prevent a DEA customer
from placing an order that exceeds a relevant intermediary's existing position or credit
limits; and require intermediaries and markets to have "adequate operational and
technical capabilities to manage appropriately the risks posed by DEA."369
In addition to IOSCO, the SEC has also turned its attention to the issues surrounding
DEA, starting with the adoption of Rule 15c3-5 on November 3, 2010.370 This rule is
designed to stop broker-dealers from allowing DEA to customers without any pre-trade
supervision, a practice known as "naked access." 37 1 Under the new rule, broker-dealers
must scrutinize customers' credit positions before the trade and stop reckless orders
before they are executed. 372
2.

High Frequency Trading

DEA allows market participants to submit orders to the trading venue to buy or sell
securities by utilizing automated trade matching programs run by exchange
intermediaries. 373 At the heart of these programs are algorithms that attempt to match
trades in the most efficient way possible. 374 However, arbitrageurs, who are nonexchange intermediaries, employ a different group of algorithms that are designed to
profit from market-making type functions in the exchanges' electronic environment. 37 5
Most of these algorithms profit from buying and selling an exchange's standardized
product as quickly as possible, 376 though some algorithms profit from long-term market

367. Id.
368. Id. at 20.
369. DEA PRINCIPLES, supra note 354, at 20-22.
370. 17 C.F.R. §240.15c3-5(b) (2010).
371. Jonathan Spicer, Insight: Brokers Point Fingersover "NakedAccess" Rule, REUTERS, Oct. 2, 2011,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/02/us-financial-regulation-risk-idUSTRE79 1DR20111002 (noting that
it the rule aimed at ending a direct pipeline to exchange).
372. Id.
373. See generally THOMAS L. HAZEN & JERRY W. MARKHAM, 23 BROKER-DEALER OPERATIONS UNDER
SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES LAW § 14:14 (2011).

374. Id.
375. Aaron Lucchetti, Fast Lane: Firms Seek Edge Through Speed As Computer Trading ExpandsTradebot Moves Its Machines into Exchange Buildings; CompetitorsFollow Suit-1 00 Million Shares in a Day,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2006, at Al (noting that these algorithms are the cornerstone of the DEA competitive
advantage).
376. HAZEN & MARKHAM, supra note 373, at ch. 9 (2010).
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movements. 37 7 HFT is a type of algorithmic trading that employs highly sophisticated
equations designed to conduct trading in rapid and continuing bursts in order to take
advantage of the narrowest market disparities. 378 HFT has become widespread,
accounting for roughly 50% of trading volume by mid-2009. 3 79
Prior to the Flash-Crash, the SEC recognized that HFT presented an array of
regulatory issues, including co-location, the risks of naked/sponsored access, and the
SEC's means of collecting information about the orders and transactions of large traders
that are not necessarily registered broker-dealers. 3 80 The SEC noted that some highfrequency trades could be executed anonymously on the exchanges, such that retail
traders were being excluded from this trading, 38 1 which could disrupt or cause market
problems because the exchanges do not know the identity of the traders. 382 Another
worrisome practice that the SEC highlighted were "flash orders," which involve high
speed, brief posting of quotes by high frequency traders. 3 83 Finally, the average computer
glitches or "fat-finger" errors at naked access firms could disrupt the entire market. 384
Though the SEC-CFTC Report did not squarely lay the blame for the Flash-Crash
on HFT, it expressly stated that "under stressed market conditions, the automated
execution of a large sell order can trigger extreme price movements, especially if the
automated execution algorithm does not take prices into account." 385 Furthermore, the
Report noted that "the interaction between automated execution programs and
algorithmic trading strategies can quickly erode liquidity and result in disorderly
markets." 386 One crucial takeaway from the Report is that traders using HFT continued
to execute automated algorithms and likely perpetuated the volatile price movements that
their algorithms were designed to hedge against and even to profit from. 38 7 In contrast,
traders that were not using HFT paused, slowed down, or refrained from trading
altogether during the crash. 3 88 The Report attributes this difference to data integrity risk,
which in the context of a Flash-Crash is better understood as a challenge facing market
389
participants in interpreting what is happening across the exchanges in real-time.
Traders that do not utilize HFT are more likely to pause when faced with data integrity
risks because they maintain human judgment over trading. While some HFT algorithms
attempt to recreate this element of human judgment, the Report amply shows that this is
not the case with the majority of automated high frequency algorithms, as most traders
377. Id
378. See generallyid. § 14:14.
379. Charles Duhigg, Stock Traders Find Speed Pays, in Milliseconds,N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2009, at Al.
380. Each of which the SEC has discussed in rule proposals or its Concept Release on Equity Market
Structure. See Exchange Act Release No. 61358 (Jan. 13, 2010); Exchange Act Release No. 61908 (Apr. 14,
2010).
381. Charles Duhigg, SEC Starts Crackdown on 'Flash' Trading,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2009, at B 1.
382. Report Sees Growth in High-Frequency Trading in Stock Markets, DEALBOOK N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14,
2009, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/12/14/38-percent-of-us-trading-now-naked-study-finds/.
383. HAZEN & MARKHAM, supranote 373, § 14:14.
384. Jessica Holzer & Kristina Patterson, SEC Bans 'Naked Access', WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703506904575592243789868142.html.
385. MARKET EVENTS REPORT, supra note 336, at 68.
386. Id at 9.
387. See id at 5-6.
388. See generally id at 1-8.
389. See id at 76.
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using HFT continued to execute trades as the market rode the downward spiral. 390
The data integrity risks are especially acute with HFT because of its heavy emphasis
on speed. Micro-and nano-seconds in transmission time can make a big difference in
returns; therefore, HFT operations seek the smallest advantages by doing things such as
co-locating with exchange servers to cut down transmission times. 39 1 The need for speed
has also led to the development of services that take news stories and information from
social media sites and translate them into data that a HIFT algorithm can understand and
use to make trading decisions. 392 If the proliferation of these services continues, the role
played by humans in trading will continue to decline, potentially creating further
systemic risk due to data integrity risk.
After the Flash-Crash, the SEC and FINRA instituted market-wide circuit breakers
that apply across all equity trading venues and the futures markets, as none of the circuit
breakers previously in place were triggered on May 6.393 The SEC and FINRA have also
indicated that market participants should move toward a more uniform procedure for
trading pauses based on different combinations of market signals, as the markets' events
show that pausing a market can be an effective way of providing time for market
participants to reassess their strategies and for an orderly market. 394 Additionally, rules
must be developed to deter market conditions that lead to multiple market participants
withdrawing simultaneously, as this can lead to the breakdown of a fair and orderly pricediscovery process. 395
In February 2011, the joint advisory committee to the SEC and CFTC issued
recommendations for regulatory responses to the Flash-Crash. 396 The joint committee
concurred with the steps the SEC took to create single stock pauses or circuit breakers for
the Russell 1000 stocks and actively traded ETFs and to enact rules to determine which
trades will be broken when there are multi-stock aberrant price movements. 397 The
committee recommended, however, that these pause rules be expanded and adjusted in
certain respects. 3 98 The committee then went on to discuss restrictions on co-location and
direct access and urged the SEC to work closely with FINRA and other exchanges with
examination responsibilities to develop effective testing of sponsoring broker-dealer risk
management controls and supervisory procedures. 39 9 Further, the committee encouraged
the CFTC to prohibit trading and quoting practices that were disruptive of fair and

390. See generallyMARKET EVENTS REPORT, supra note 336, at 1-8.
391. HAZEN & MARKHAM, supranote 373, § 14:14.
392. Tom
Steinert-Threlkeld,
Machine-Readable
Tweet
Streams for
Algos
Arrive,
SECURITIESTECHNOLOGYMONITOR.COM (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.securitiestechnologymonitor.com/news/
machine-readable-tweet-streams-algo-trading-gnip-29578-1.html.
393. MARKET EVENTS REPORT, supra note 336, at 6.
394. Id. at 6.
395. Id. at 5. The extreme case is where trades are executed at stub-quotes used by market makers to fulfill
their continuous two-sided quoting obligations.
396. See JOINT CFTC-SEC ADVISORY COMM. ON EMERGING REGULATORY ISSUES, RECOMMENDATIONS
REGARDING REGULATORY RESPONSES TO THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010 (2011) [hereinafter CFTC-

SEC ADVISORY COMM.], available at http://www.cfic.gov/ucm/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/
jacreport 02181 1.pdf (recommending a series of 14 responses to the flash crash).
397. Id. at 4.
398. Id. at 5-6.
399. Id. at 7.
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equitable trading-in particular, large order algorithms that employ unlimited use of
market orders. 400
An argument could be made that HFT is moving the markets away from their
traditional roles of price discovery and value creation for investors and capital formation
for America's economy. Because high frequency traders do not have the same market
capabilities or opportunities, growth of HFT could be creating a two-tiered market-one
for high frequency traders and another for everyone else. As illustrated by the market
data integrity risks, the trading during the Flash-Crash had no informational value for
price discovery to investors that were not using HFT strategies. More than a year after the
Flash-Crash and the CFTC-SEC Report on its causes, HFT continues to be controversial
with strong critics and defenders. 4 01
3.

Dark Pools

A "dark pool" is any pool of liquidity that can be accessed electronically and
provides no pre-trade transparency regarding the orders that are received by the pool,
while a "dark order" refers to an electronic order that can be automatically executed and
for which there is no pre-trade transparency. 4 02 Some large market participants prefer
dark pools because they allow investors to keep orders secret so that other market
participants cannot detect large transactions and exploit them. 403
Dark pools are operated as off-exchange trading venues in the form of electronic
communications networks (ECNs). ECNs entered the financial markets as a significant
force beginning in the early 1990s. Regulators often refer to ECNs as automated trading
systems (ATSs) 404 because they match trades using computers and sophisticated
algorithms. 405 Previously, traditional exchanges had employed algorithms for their own
trading activities, 406 but trade-matching algorithms became the cornerstone of the
development and competitive advantage of ECNs,4 07 as major algorithms allow for
400. Id. at 8.
401. See Liz Skinner, Institutional Traders Down on High Frequency Traders, INVESTMENT NEWS, Sept.
12, 2011, http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20110912/FREE/110919991; NYSE Executive Calls For
Clarity on High-Frequency Trading Controversy, HUFFINGTON POST Bus., http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2011/09/12/high-frequency-trading-nyse n_958499.html (last visited June 22, 2012).
402.

TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE IOSCO, PRINCIPLES FOR DARK LIQUIDITY (2011) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES

FOR DARK LIQUIDITY], available at www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdflIOSCOPD353.pdf.
403. For an example of exploitation, consider an institutional buyer, such as a large pension fund, that
wishes to purchase a large amount of stock. Other traders, noticing the increased demand for this certain
security due to the pension fund accumulating the position, may buy the stock as well in hopes that the pension
fund will continue to buy, and they will be able to sell the stock to the fund at a profit, which effectively raises
the price of the security for the pension fund.
404. See generally Paul D. Cohen, Securities Trading via the Internet, 4 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1 (1999)
(describing various forms of ECNs).
405. See Gerald T. Nowak, A Failureof Communication:An Argument for the Closing of the NYSE Floor,
26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 485, 485 (1993); see generally Lewis D. Solomon & Louise Corso, The Impact of
Technology on the Trading of Securities: The Emerging Global Market and the Implicationsfor Regulation, 24
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 299 (1991) (describing the effect of technology on trading).
406. "Exchanges typically employ a series of algorithms to address all of the different order issues the
exchange may receive. For instance, the algorithms for recognizing user names or uncrossing orders can be
applied to all markets exchange wide." Markham & Harty, supra note 352, at 902 n.301.
407.

See COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM'N, TECH. ADVISORY COMM., BEST PRACTICES FOR
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anonymity of market users, speed, and liquidity capacity. 40 8 As detailed in the SEC's
2010 Market Structure Concept Release, ATSs have split into two distinct groups. 409 The
distinction between the groups is largely a function of the rules promulgated by the SEC
under the national market system (NMS) which Congress created in 1975 to replace the
previous fixed commission regime. Under the NMS, exchange members are required to
disclose consolidated market data regarding their trades to the market. 4 10 The following
excerpt from the Market Structure Concept Release describes the content of the
disclosure and Congress's motive in requiring it:
[C]onsolidated market data includes both: (1) pre-trade transparency-realtime information on the best-priced quotations at which trades may be executed
in the future ("consolidated quotation data"); and (2) post-trade transparencyreal-time reports of trades as they are executed ("consolidated trade data"). As
a result, the public has ready access to a comprehensive, accurate, and reliable
source of information for the prices and volume of any NMS stock at any time
during the trading day. This information serves an essential linkage function by
helping assure that the public is aware of the best-displayed prices for a stock,
no matter where they may arise in the national market system. It also enables
investors to monitor the prices at which their orders are executed and assess
whether their orders received best execution. 4 11
The difference in ATSs revolves around pre-trade transparency. The first group of
ATSs report consolidated quotation data for every trade that occurs on the exchange.
These ATSs are essentially electronic equivalents to the traditional exchanges and some
have grown so big that they seek registration as a stock exchange in order to compete
directly with the traditional markets, such as the NYSE, through their electronic
facilities. 4 12 The second group of ATSs, dark pools, do not report consolidated quotation
ORGANIZED ELECTRONIC MARKETS 5 (2002), availableat http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@aboutcflc/
documents/file/tac_042402_bestpractices.pdf (defining privilege market access as "any rule, policy or
processing convention of organized markets that discriminates among classes of market participants when
providing any of their services, access to their services or access to market critical information").
408. See Markham & Harty, supra note 352, at 904 n.304; see, e.g., U.S. FUTURES EXCHANGE, LLC,
CFTC TECHNICAL QUESTIONNAIRE, 2 (Sept. 2003), available at http://www.cftc.gov/files/submissions/
dcodcm/dcm037f.pdf (stating that "Eurex continuously upgrades its trading software, releasing and installing
significantly upgraded versions about every fifteen months").
409. Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Exchange Act Release No. 61358, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594
(Jan. 21, 2010) [hereinafter Market Structure Release].
410. Id. at 10.
411. Id.
412. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. McCarroll, Regulation of Electronic Communications Networks: An
Examination of TradepointFinancialNetwork's SEC Approval to Become the FirstNon-American Exchange to
Operate in the United States, 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 211, 216-17 (2000); Charles C. Cox & Douglas C.
Michael, The Market for Markets: Development of InternationalSecurities and Commodities Trading, 36
CATH. U. L. REv. 833, 840-41 (1987); see also Securities Exchange Act Release No. 41666 (July 28, 1999);
Markham & Harty, supra note 352, at 912. "'Electronic trading' encompasses a wide range of systems that
facilitate the entry and execution of orders electronically by algorithms." Id. at 902. For a description of
algorithmic trading in the futures industry, see Will Acworth, Algorithmic Trading, Seeking an Edge, FUTURES
INDUS. MAG. 24 (July-Aug. 2007). An algorithm has been defined as a fixed step-by-step procedure for
accomplishing a given result-usually a simplified procedure for solving a complex problem, and also a full
statement of a finite number of steps. CHARLES J. SIPPL & ROGER J. SIPPL, COMPUTER DICTIONARY AND
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data. 4 13
The rise in dark pools began with the deregulation of the securities exchanges in
1975. Prior to 1975, dark pools were not possible because maintenance of fixed
commission rates came with a constraint prohibiting exchange members from trading
exchange-listed securities off the exchange board. 4 14 In 1975, however, the fixed
commission regime ended and so did the ban on off-exchange trading in various
situations, opening the door for off-exchange venues such as dark pools. 4 15
Another factor that fueled the rise of dark pools was the demutualization of
exchanges. 4 16 The first stock exchange to demutualize was the Stockholm Stock
Exchange in 1993.417 By 1999, of 52 exchanges present at a meeting of the Federation
Internationale des Bourses des Valeurs, 15 had demutualized, 14 had member approval to
demutualize, and 15 were actively contemplating demutualization. 4 18 The NYSE did not
demutualize until 2005.419 These changes in stock exchange structure and governance led
to cross-border mergers that are still ongoing. 420 This changed model for the secondary
trading markets was a response to international competition and competition from off
exchange trading venues.
While deregulation and demutualization opened the door for dark pools, one of the
chief reasons for their rapid proliferation in the last decade is the SEC's promulgation of
Regulation NMS in 2004.421 Prior to Regulation NMS, institutional investors were able
to pursue strategies that kept their orders secret and thus avoid the problem of others
exploiting their trade described above. 422 Regulation NMS, however, required registered
national exchanges to aggregate as well as publicize all quotes and forced broker-dealers
to execute trades at the best price. 42 3 This Regulation, combined with the move to listing
stocks in decimal increments, made cloaking trades on the registered exchanges virtually
impossible. 424 Institutional investors, therefore, sought a new way to hide their trades and
found it in the form of Regulation ATS. Regulation ATS, enacted in 1998, allowed
HANDBOOK 23 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter COMPUTER DICTIONARY].
413. HAzEN & MARKHAM, supra note 373.
414. COMPUTER DICTIONARY, supra note 412, at 156.

415. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 4, 89 Stat. 97, 107-09, amending
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 6(e).
416. "'Demutualization' is a term used to describe the transition of a securities exchange from a mutual
association of exchange members operating on a not-for-profit basis to a limited liability, for-profit company
accountable to shareholders." Jennifer A. Elliott, Demutualization of Securities Exchanges: A Regulatory
Perspective4 (IMF, Working Paper No. 02/119, 2002).
417. MICHAEL GORHAM & NIDHI SINGH, ELECTRONIC EXCHANGES: THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION
FROM PITS TO BITS 104 (2009).
418. TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE IOSCO, ISSUES PAPER ON EXCHANGE DEMUTUALIZATION 3 (2001).
419. See Redrawing the Battle Lines, ECONOMIST, Apr. 30, 2005, http://www.economist.com/
node/3915123 (noting that consolidation has caused an uproar on NYSE).
420. See generally Roberta S. Karmel, The Once and FutureNew York Stock Exchange: The Regulation of
Global Exchanges, 1BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 355 (2007) (noting cross-border mergers at the time).
421. Regulation of the National Market System, 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.600-612 (2009) (changing rules for the
regulation of the national market system).
422. Regulation of Non-Public Trading Interest, 74 Fed. Reg. 61,208, 61,209 n.4 (proposed Nov. 13, 2009)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242) [hereinafter SEC Dark Pools Rule Proposal].
423. 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.600-612.
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trading to occur without the disclosure of public quotes so long as trading volume in a
particular stock on the ATS did not exceed five percent of the national trading volume in
that stock. 425 This loophole, combined with advances in computer technology and trade
matching algorithms, allowed dark pools to take off.426
Despite this growth, it was challenging for dark pool operators to find counter
parties for their customers. 427 In response, dark pools started using indications of interest
(101) to attract liquidity. 42 8 IOls, which did not have to be disclosed under Regulation
NMS, "served as notice that a dark pool was attempting to conduct a transaction
involving a specific security." 429 This innovation, combined with many large brokerdealers engaging in dark trading, 430 established dark pools as a force to be reckoned with
in the global markets. 4 3 1
Even before the Flash-Crash the rise of dark pools caused regulators to worry about
market fragmentation, which is the "the existence of multiple, geographically separated
forums in which trading in the same security occurs ... ."432 Fragmentation can cause
inefficiency and, under some conditions, systemic risk in the securities markets because it
can disturb the price discovery mechanism of markets by scattering liquidity and order
flow among various markets. One undesirable effect of fragmentation is an increase in
the bid-ask spread for securities, which was exhibited during the Flash-Crash in
spectacular fashion. 433 The SEC recognized these issues prior to the Flash-Crash in its
January 2010 Concept Release on Market Structure (Market Structure Concept Release),
which raised issues about fragmentation, efficiency, and fairness in the public equity
markets in view of high frequency trading, dark pools, direct electronic access, and
related matters. 4 34 In soliciting comments, the SEC asked: "[flor example, do the high
speed and enormous message traffic of automated trading systems threaten the integrity
of trading center operations?" 435 Before the SEC even had an opportunity to evaluate the
comments it received in response to this question; the Flash-Crash provided a resounding

425. See Regulation Alternative Trading Systems, 17 C.F.R. § 242.300 (2009) (describing the
requirements for ATS).
426. By 2007, it was estimated there were 40 such pools being operated. David Bogoslaw, Big Traders
Dive into Dark Pools, BUS. WEEK ONLINE (Oct. 3, 2007, 12:01 AM), http://www.businessweek.com/
print/investor/content/oct2007/pi2007102_394204.htm.
427. Robert Hatch, Reforming the Murky Depths of Wall Street: Putting the Spotlight on the Security and
Exchange Commission's Regulatory Proposal Concerning Dark Pools of Liquidity, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
1032, 1037 (2010).
428. Id.
429. Id. at 1038.
430. Many of Wall Street's investment banks sought to perform trades without using public exchanges.
Goldman Sachs built the largest dark pool in the country, Sigma-X-and Merrill Lynch and Citigroup also built
their own dark pool operations. Id.
431. In September 2009, 7.9% of share volume in NMS stocks was in dark pools. Market Structure
Release, supranote 409, at fig. 6.
432. Junius W. Peake, Entropy and the National Market System, 1 BROOK. J. CORP., FIN. & COM. L. 301
(2007) (citing Exchange Act Release No. 14,416, 43 Fed. Reg. 4354, 4354 (Feb. 1, 1978)).
433. Roberta S. Karmel, A Retrospective on the Unfixing of Rates and Related Deregulation, in
REGULATED EXCHANGES: DYNAMiC AGENTS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 149, 156 (Larry Harris ed., 2010).
434. See generally Market Structure Release, supra note 409 (requesting comments from market
participants).
435. Id. at 31.
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"Yes."
Dark pools raise a number of regulatory concerns beyond market fragmentation. The
first concern is that, by hiding information from the public, they can harm the integrity of
public price quotes because investors do not know if they are getting the best price for
their transactions. 436 A second concern is the dark pools could attract enough liquidity
out of traditional exchanges to make it harder and more expensive for retail investors to
trade. 437 The IOSCO Technical Committee has expressed the view that pre-trade
transparency is a key element of the price discovery process and that it was concerned
about free-rider problems when dark orders and dark pools do not contribute to pre-trade
price discovery. 438 According to the Technical Committee, dark pools' lack of pre-trade
transparency leads to information fragmentation problem, and when a jurisdiction has
multiple dark pools, it faces the possibility that post-trade information may not be
consolidated with post-trade information from other venues. 439
Although the use of dark pools is most pronounced in the United States and Europe,
other regions could also experience dark pool growth driven by the same elements that
drove growth in the United States and Europe, such as innovative execution platforms
and the search for low-cost, low-impact executions. 44 0 Jurisdictions differ in their
regulation of dark pool operators-for example, some are regulated as exchanges, some
are subject to registration requirements for investment dealers, and some are regulated as
an intermediary. 44 1 Dark orders, on the other hand, are subject to regulations akin to
those for displayed orders, but are not subject to pre-trade transparency requirements. 44 2
According to IOSCO, regulators agree that transparency is a core element in achieving
fair, orderly, and efficient markets, but they approach transparency in different ways.443
The United States and Canada, for example, encourage transparency by giving
transparent orders time priority over dark orders that are at the same price level within a
trading venue. 444 As markets become increasingly fragmented and complex, IOSCO
believes that regulators should ensure that pre-trade information is available to markets,
while being aware that the costs of pre-trade transparency is of concern to professional
investors.4 45 With respect to post-trade transparency, most jurisdictions require
information about trades executed in dark pools to be published immediately, although
the nature of the information that is disseminated to the public varies across

436. Keith Fitz-Gerald, Are "Dark Pools" Destined to Be the Capital Markets' Next Black Hole?,
MONEYMORNING.COM (July 10, 2008), http://www.moneymorning.com/2008/07/10/dark-pools/.
437. Id.
438. PRINCIPLES FOR DARK LIQUIDITY, supra note 402, at 19. The regulatory frameworks that are used to
protect the integrity of the price discovery process include: "ensuring transparent orders receive execution
priority over dark orders; ensuring dark pools provide price improvement over the National Best Bid/Offer to
small orders; ensuring limited scope for waivers to pre-trade transparency; referencing prices within the dark
pools to those of the national exchange; and trade through protection." Id. at 20-21. As for information received
post-trade, regulatory initiatives may be needed to improve the accuracy of information available. Id. at 21.
439. Id at 20.
440. Id at 11.
441. PRINCIPLES FOR DARK LIQUIDITY, supra note 402, at 14.
442. Id at15.
443. Id.
444. Id at 16.
445. Id.
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jurisdictions. 446 Also, most jurisdictions require trades executed on dark pools to be
reported to regulators, although the nature of the information that is reported varies.
Some reporting is done on a real-time basis, while other jurisdictions require reporting at
the end of the day or at the end of the quarter." 7
In May 2011, IOSCO published its Final Report on Principles for Dark Liquidity.448
This report focused on transparency and price discovery, fragmentation, knowledge of
trading intentions, fair access, and the ability of market players and regulators to assess
actual trading volume in dark pools.44 9 The expanded use of dark liquidity and dark pools
is an innovation that developed as a result of the increased competition among trading
venues that provide liquidity for equity securities. 45 0 Transparency in trades, however,
suffered as a result of the increased use of dark liquidity. While IOSCO has long held the
belief that market transparency is vital to the fairness and efficiency of a market, it also
recognizes that transparency may lead to disincentives for those who have financial
interests in larger trades. 45 1 Accordingly, IOSCO has previously urged regulators to
assess the appropriate level of transparency and to develop transparent regimes that are
coherent across all venues. 452
The Technical Committee also raised concerns about fairness and market
integrity. 4 53 As IOSCO has always called for fair access to markets and trading
opportunities, the Technical Committee expressed its concern that dark pools might
unfairly deny certain participants access because access to dark pools is often
restricted. 454 To ensure fair price discovery, all similarly situated market participants
should have equitable access to trading information on a reasonable and nondiscriminatory basis, but dark pools compromise this principle. 4 55 Finally, the Technical
Committee expressed concerns about market participants' lack of information about the
operations of dark pools and dark orders, which may result in market participants making
uninformed trading decisions and ultimately in a lack of confidence in the market. 456
In view of these regulatory problems, IOSCO drafted principles on dark pools and
dark orders that are designed to minimize the adverse impact on the price discovery
process; mitigate the effect of potential fragmentation of information and liquidity;
ensure regulators have access to adequate information to monitor the use of dark pools
and dark orders; ensure that investors have sufficient information to understand how
orders are handled and executed; and increase the monitoring of dark orders and dark
pools to facilitate an appropriate regulatory response. 457 The principles are divided into
five topics: transparency to market participants and issuers; priority of transparent orders;
reporting to regulators; information available to market participants; and regulation of the
446.

PRINCIPLES FOR DARK LIQUIDITY, supra note 402, at 17-18.

447.
448.
449.
450.

Id. at 19.
See generally id. (noting concerns about dark trading).
Id. at 2.
Id. at 4.
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Id at 21-22.
Id. at 22.
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development of dark pools and dark orders. 458
The first principle is that the price and volume of firm bids and offers should
generally be transparent to the public. 4 59 The second principle is that information
regarding trades should be transparent to the public. 4 60 Thirdly, where relevant,
regulators should support the use of transparent orders rather than dark orders executed
on transparent markets or orders submitted into dark pools. 46 1 Also, regulators should
have access to information regarding orders and trade information in venues that offer
trading in dark pools or dark orders. Regulators should ensure that entities that deal with
anything deemed "dark" "provide market participants with sufficient information so that
they are able to understand the manner in which their orders are handled and executed.
Finally, regulators should periodically monitor the development of dark pools and dark
orders in their jurisdictions . . . " to ensure "efficiency of the price formation process on
displayed markets." 4 62
In addition to IOSCO, the SEC and CFTC have issued recommendations concerning
dark pools in their joint report on the regulatory response to the Flash-Crash. In regards
to dark pools, the rising proportion of equity transactions that trade without any public
display of liquidity prompted the SEC-CFTC Committee to encourage the SEC and
CFTC to consider incentives to supply liquidity, especially in turbulent markets. 463
Similarly, the committee recommended the development of incentives or regulation for
persons who implement market maker strategies to maintain best buy and sell quotations
that are reasonably related to the market, 4 64 although this recommendation stopped short
of recommending market maker obligations. The committee also focused on
internalization, pointing out that one-third of share volume is executed on dark trading
venues. 4 65 Therefore, the SEC should conduct further analysis as to the impact of a
broker-dealer maintaining privileged execution access as a result of internalizing
customer orders and imposing obligations on such broker-dealers with respect to these
order executions. 466 Also, the committee recommended that the SEC study the costs and
benefits of alternative routing requirements to Regulation NMS rules. 467 Both the SEC
and CFTC were urged to consider reporting requirements for measures of liquidity and
market imbalance for large market venues. 468 Finally, the committee recommended that
458. Id. at 25-32.
459. "However, where regulators consider permitting different market structures or order types that do not
provide pre-trade transparency, they should consider the impact of doing so on price discovery, fragmentation,
fairness and overall market quality." TECHNICAL COMM. OF IOSCO, ISSUES RAISED BY DARK LIQUIDITY
CONSULTATION REPORT (Oct. 2010), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdflIOSCOPD336.pdf
?&lang-enus&output-json.
460. This includes information on trades executed in dark pools or as a result of dark orders entered in
transparent markets. Regulators should consider both positive and negative impacts of identifying a dark venue
and/or the fact that the trade resulted from a dark order.
461. Transparent orders should have priority over dark orders at the same price within a trading venue.
462. IOSCO TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES, infra note 470; PRINCIPLES FOR DARK LIQUIDITY, supra note
402, at 22.
463. CFTC-SEC ADVISORY COMM., supra note 396, at 10-11.
464. Id.
465. Id. at 11.
466. Id. at12.
467. Id. at 13.
468. CFTC-SEC ADVISORY COMM., supra note 396, at 14.
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the SEC proceed with some urgency to implement a consolidated audit trail for the U.S.
equity markets and that the CFTC also enhance its data collection. 469
4.

Recent Developments and Outlook Moving Forward

Debates about market structure are likely to continue in the wake of the Flash-Crash
and public criticism of HFT on a U.S. domestic and international level. IOSCO is
fostering further debate through its Consultation Report on Regulatory Issues Raised by
the Impact of Technological Changes on Market Integrity and Efficiency, which it
published in July 2011.470 This report was in response to a direction for reform from the
G-20 to develop and report to the FSB "recommendations to promote markets' integrity
and efficiency and to mitigate the risks posed to the financial system by the latest
technological developments." 47 1 The purpose of the report is to build on the papers the
IOSCO previously issued covering market structure, which this Article previously
discussed, and specifically to seek comments on HFT. 4 72
For purposes of its report, the Technical Committee put forth two important
definitions. It defined "market integrity" as "the extent to which a market operates in a
manner that is, and is perceived to be, fair and orderly and where effective rules are in
place and enforced by regulators so that confidence and participation in the market is
fostered." 473 "Market efficiency" is defined as "the ability of market participants to
transact business easily and at a price that reflects all available market information" and
is determined using factors such as "liquidity, price discovery and transparency." 474
Further, the report asserts that financial markets should fulfill their role of "financing the
real economy, by channeling investments and savings, facilitating capital formation and
efficiently allocating and transferring risk." 4 75 The Technical Committee then focuses on
the most important technological changes in the trading markets: algorithmic trading,
market fragmentation and dark liquidity, DEA, co-location, tick sizes, and fee
structures. 476 It notes that high frequency traders provide liquidity to the markets, but
discourage some market participants from using the market and contributing to the
transmission of stocks across trading venues. 477 As a result, fundamental investors may
withdraw from the market. 4 78
Due to the level of concern emanating from the Flash-Crash, policy makers have put
HFT at the top of the policy agenda. 479 Although HFT and all of the related problems
arising from the technological changes this Article discusses are primarily the focus of
469.

Id.

470. See generally TECHNICAL COMM. OF IOSCO, REGULATORY ISSUES RAISED BY THE IMPACT OF
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES ON MARKET INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY CONSULTATION REPORT (July 2011)

[hereinafter IOSCO TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES], available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/
IOSCOPD354.pdf (analyzing HFT).
471. Id. at 6.
472. Id. at 7.
473. Id. at 8.
474. Id
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market regulators in the United States and Europe, regulators in India, Australia, and
Canada have also focused on these matters. 480 The Technical Committee acknowledges
that HFT cannot be defined as any one strategy, but finds that most of the strategies are
based on profiting from very small price changes and rapid capital turnover. 48 1 The
Technical Committee states that IHFT falls into three broad categories: market making,
arbitrage, and directional. 482 As for the effects of HFT, the Technical Committee asserts
that the empirical evidence on the impact of HFT is scarce, but the available evidence
fails to uncover a consistent and significant negative effect on liquidity. Yet, the quality
of that liquidity is of concern. 4 83 Further, HFT may have had an adverse impact on
confidence in the fairness and integrity of markets. 4 84 It also appears that HFT may result
in extreme price shocks that the market easily transmits. 485
The Technical Committee noted some regulatory initiatives taken by the SEC,
(proposals for a consolidated audit trail and larger trader reporting), the European
Commission (review of MiFID with regard to HFT and other matters), and the ASIC in
Australia (proposals on DEA, risk controls for automated trading, volatility controls, and
pre-trade transparency). 486 It also noted its own prior reports relating to market structure
and the principles set forth, many of which this Article discussed. 487 Some possible
future actions for the regulation of trading firms, market operators, and market structure
were also set forth. 488 The Technical Committee then posed fourteen questions of its
members regarding the extent of the risks to market integrity and efficiency from HFT
and other technological developments in the trading markets and how to prioritize steps
to mitigate those risks. 489 The comments from industry members to the questions posed
by the Joint SEC-CFTC Advisory Committee in their report were in large part
negative. 490 Whether IOSCO members will respond differently to the questions posed by
the Technical Committee remains to be seen.
More recently, there have been several signs that regulators are making moves to
address the issues surrounding HFT and dark pools. In regards to HFT, one idea that has
491
gained traction in a number of countries is the imposition of a financial transaction tax.
France has moved quickest on this idea, with its Senate approving a bill on November 22,
2011, that would apply a transaction tax to market participants "in cases where daily
cancellation rates for orders for buying and selling financial instruments on public

480, IOSCO TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES, supra note 470, at 20. HFT accounts for 56% of the trading in the
United States, for 38% in Europe, and for 10-30% in Asia. Id at 22.
481.

Id. at 23.

Id. at 23.
Id at 27.
IOSCO TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGES, supranote 470, at 24-27.
Id. at 29.
Id at 32-33.
See id. at 31-37, annexes 1-4.
Id at 38-40.
IOSCO TECHNICAL CHANGES, supra note 470, at 41-42.
Id at 27.
See Dave Crisant, A Financial Transaction Tax Could Weed out All the Pointless Trading, BUS.
INSIDER (Jan. 4, 2012), http://articies.businessinsider.com/2012-01-04/markets/30587803_1 trading-volumehigh-frequency-trading-yakov-amihud#ixzzltaRC3utk.
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markets exceed 50%."492 The European Union has brought forth a proposal to tax trades
in stock and bonds at .1% and trades in derivatives at .01%.493 Despite push back from
financial interests, the EU Parliament has urged that such a tax be passed.494 A similar
proposal has been made in the U.S. Congress, with Senator Tom Harkin and
Representative Peter DeFazio co-sponsoring a bill that would tax all financial
transactions at .03%.495 A financial transaction tax of the type that have been proposed
would make HFT impossible because the very small profits that are made on each trade
would be wiped out after the trade tax was assessed. 4 96 Fearing the loss of profits
generated by HFT, certain members of the securities industry have voiced strong
opposition to any such tax. In particular, Bill Brodsky, chief executive of the Chicago
Board Options Exchange, has lauded HFT for brining cheaper and more efficient
financial trading to all market participants. 4 97 According to Brodsky, "[t]o say [HFT]
causes volatility is completely erroneous . . . [t]he flash crash was an aberration. The

regulators forced changes on the markets and didn't understand all the consequences. The
only effect HFT has had has been to make markets fast, cheap and liquid." 498
Another idea is to install "limit up, limit down" trading mechanisms. 499 On May 25,
2011, NYSE Euronext, on behalf of a large number of U.S. stock exchanges, submitted a
plan to the SEC entitled National Market System Plan to Address Extraordinary Market
Volatility. 500 The proposed procedures "specify market-wide limit up-limit down
requirements designed to prevent trades in individual national market system stocks from
occurring outside specified price bands."50 1 These procedures would be coupled with
trading pauses to accommodate more fundamental price moves, as opposed to erroneous
trades or gaps in liquidity that are momentary. 502
While there has been significant attention paid to HFT, regulators have done little to
address the issues surrounding dark pools. One notable exception to this is the SEC's first
enforcement action concerning a dark pool, brought against Pipeline Trading Systems
LLC. 50 3 The action, which was settled by the company for $1.2 million, alleged "that the
firm was running a secret affiliate that sought to trade ahead of customers' orders before

492. Ulrika Lomas, French Senate Approves Automated Transactions Tax, TAX-NEWS.COM, Nov. 23,
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494. See Push Ahead with Financial Transaction Tax, MEPs Urge, PUBLIC SERVICE EUROPE, May 23,
2012, availableat http://www.publicserviceeurope.com/article/1971/push-ahead-with-financial-transaction-taxmeps-urge.
495. Phil Mattingly, U.S. Lawmakers Outline Financial-Transaction Tax Proposal, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK, Nov. 8, 2011, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011- 1-08/u-s-lawmakers-outlinefinancial-transaction-tax-proposal.html.
496. Id
497. Hal Weitzman, Brodsky Slams 'Absurd' HFT Curbs, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2011, at 24.
498. Id. (quoting Bill Brodsky).
499. Press Release, SEC, SEC Announces Filing of Limit up-Limit down Proposal to Address
Extraordinary Market Volatility (Apr. 5, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-84.htm.
500. Joint Industry Plan, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 64547, 76 Fed. Reg. 31647 (May 25, 2011).
501. Id.
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503. Jacob Bunge, 'Dark Pool' Settlement Shines Light on PotentialAbuses, WALL ST. J, Oct. 25, 2011,
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filling 'a vast majority' of them on the private market." 504
Another reform, proposed by the SEC, is the development of a consolidated audit
trail. 505 This proposal aims to address the issues surrounding both HFT and dark pools by
providing the SEC a real-time data feed of detailed market activity. 50 6 Currently, the SEC
must rely on data from FINRA, exchanges, and firms, such as mutual funds and banktrading desks, to track the market. 507 Further, the SEC is unable to track a large amount
of trading every day. 508 Additionally, as was the case with the Flash-Crash report, the
lack of a central repository for data can lead to significant delays in diagnosing what went
wrong after an irregular market event. With a consolidated audit trail, the SEC would be
able to directly monitor the market, reducing the negative effects of the current
information asymmetry.
The Flash-Crash exposed serious dysfunction and risk in the trading markets, but it
seems that the regulators thus far do not have the knowledge or backbone to take serious
actions to mitigate these problems, especially in the face of industry opposition. Further,
the securities industry has conflicts of interest with regard to these matters. Will IOSCO,
as an international body, be able to generate reforms that the SEC, CFTC, and other
national regulators are unwilling or unprepared to undertake? The answer to this question
may depend in part upon what further pressure the G-20 brings to bear on IOSCO.
IV.

IOSCO'S ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION

Although many agencies are involved in international harmonization of financial
regulation, and they have all been active in promulgating new standards in the wake of
the 2008 financial crisis, IOSCO is the only organization specifically devoted to
securities regulation. Also, it is the only organization that includes all or virtually all of
the world's securities commissions. IOSCO is devoted to establishing harmonized
international standards for the regulation of securities issuances and trading, but because
it includes both developed and emerging marketplaces in its constituency, it is able to
formulate only very general standards for all of its members. Although the Technical
Committee is comprised of the mature capital market regulators, IOSCO is also
hampered in developing rigorous international standards for those markets by the size and
variety of the members of the Technical Committee, the different corporate finance
structures in the countries of the Technical Committee, and rivalries among these
countries and their regulators for primacy in the capital markets. The danger of a race to
the bottom is always a threat to the effort by some jurisdictions, especially the continental
countries of the European Union and the United States, to establish stricter regulatory
standards. Further, many of the serious threats to market stability, such as fragmented
markets and HFT, have emerged first in the United States, and then spread only later, if at
all, to other marketplaces, so only a few of IOSCO members are even interested in

504. Id
505. Consolidated Audit Trail, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-62174 (proposed May 26, 2010)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242).
506. Id.
507. Scott Patterson, SEC Pushes Plan for Audit Systems, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2011,
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developing harmonized standards to deal with these threats. Further, the political
situation in the United States since the 2008 meltdown, and in Europe since the sovereign
debt crisis, makes it very difficult for securities regulators to agree upon new measures to
counter systemic threats.
Governments generally, and regulators particularly, are frequently fighting the last
war. This Article has outlined some of IOSCO's initiatives in that regard, such as the
regulation of hedge funds, CRAs, and short selling. Even with regard to these matters,
there is a general agreement that hedge funds and CRAs should be subject to registration
with securities authorities and better regulation, but there has not been agreement about
what that better regulation should be. The IOSCO principles on short selling did not
recommend short selling bans, but rather prohibitions on naked short selling and
disclosure. Nevertheless, in the summer of 2011, several European countries imposed
bans on the short selling of bank stocks. These bans probably were ineffective in
509
National
curtailing the decline of the price of bank stocks except very temporarily.
politics in this case trumped harmonization.
In the case of new and ongoing systemic threats, IOSCO seems unlikely to put a
damper on DEA, dark pools, and HFT. Since the most advanced examples of these
trading strategies are taking place in the United States, if the SEC or other U.S. regulatory
agencies are unable to curb these threats to the public trading markets, it is unlikely that
IOSCO will be able to do so. Where many regulators, particularly securities commissions
represented in the Technical Committee, agree upon standards, then harmonization by
IOSCO is possible. Even then, however, since any new standards must be implemented
on a country-by-country basis, and primarily in countries with notice and comment
procedures, standards that are strongly opposed by the securities industry may well not be
implemented. In the United States, even where a controversial standard is put into place
by a regulatory agency, a court challenge is always possible. Further, because IOSCO
only establishes standards and does not enforce these standards, implementation of
agreed upon standards may vary.
IOSCO has long been amenable to leadership by the SEC, but the SEC is currently
under political attack by the left and the right. Although the agency survived under
Dodd-Frank and even greatly increased its authority, especially with respect to some of
the matters discussed in this Article, such as hedge fund and CRA regulation, its power
has been eclipsed to some extent by the FSOC and the banking agencies. Just as the SEC
must now pay attention to the Federal Reserve Board, IOSCO is to some extent
subservient to the G-20. Although IOSCO has responded to the financial crisis by
expanding its horizons and focusing on financial stability, it is not as important a player
in the league of international financial regulators as others.

509. See Jennifer Hughes, Short Sellers Remain Calm Despite Bans, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2011,
James
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/fbb599e2-c8eO-l leO-aed8-00144feabdcO.html#axzzlrHsqvxFC;
Mackintosh, The Short View, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2011, at 15.
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